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ABSTRACT. We consider a dynamic moral hazard problem between a principal and an
agent, where the sole instrument the principal has to incentivize the agent is the disclo-
sure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of times
the agent chooses a particular action, e.g., to work hard. We show that there exists an
optimal contract, where the principal stops disclosing information as soon as its most pre-
ferred action is a static best reply for the agent or else continues disclosing information
until the agent perfectly learns the principal’s private information. If the agent perfectly
learns the state, he learns it in finite time with probability one; the more patient the
agent, the later he learns it.
KEYWORDS: Dynamic, contract, information, revelation, disclosure, sender, receiver, per-
suasion.
JEL CLASSIFICATION: C73; D82.
Date: July 14, 2020.
Claudio Mezzetti thankfully acknowledges financial support from the Australian Research Council Dis-
covery grant DP190102904. Ludovic Renou gratefully acknowledges the support of the Agence Nationale
pour la Recherche under grant ANR CIGNE (ANR-15-CE38-0007-01) and through the ORA Project “Ambi-
guity in Dynamic Environments” (ANR-18-ORAR-0005). We thank Emmanuel Macron and Boris Johnson
for granting us an extended period of concentrated research.
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
05
98
3v
1 
 [e
co
n.T
H]
  1
2 J
ul 
20
20
21. INTRODUCTION
Public authorities routinely attempt at persuading the public to follow specific recom-
mendations. For instance, national health services regularly promote the heath benefits
of eating fruits and vegetables, of exercising or of limiting alcohol consumption. As an-
other instance, during the Covid-19 outbreak, authorities were instructing the public
to practice social distancing. In these instances, as in many others, the public may not
fully embrace the recommendations. The public may elect to follow some but not all
recommendations or to flexibly interpret them. E.g., an individual may decide that eat-
ing three portions of fruits and vegetables a day is plenty, despite a recommendation of
seven. Similarly, during the Covid-19 lockdowns, an individual may decide to exercise
outdoors two to three times a day, despite public authorities recommending to exercise
outdoors at most once a day. In most of these instances, public authorities cannot, or
do not choose to, enforce their recommendations. Yet, they can still nudge the public
towards full compliance with judicious provision of information. The problem of the op-
timal provision of information over time is naturally not limited to persuading the public
to follow some recommendations. Other examples include financial advisers persuading
clients to follow their advises, firms persuading customers to purchase their products,
or employers persuading employees to work hard. How best to do so?
To study this question, we consider a simple “principal-agent” model, where the sole
instrument the principal has is information.1 The principal aims at incentivizing the
agent to choose the same action, e.g., be fully compliant, buy the product or work hard,
as often as possible, and can only do so by disclosing information about an unknown
(binary) state, e.g., whether the policy recommendation is effective, the product is good
or the task is easy. We assume the principal commits to a disclosure policy. E.g., during
the Covid-19 outbreak, the UK government committed to daily report the number of new
cases of Covid-19 (and was choosing the testing policy).2 We refer to the commitment to
a disclosure policy as a “contract.”
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a complete characterization of an opti-
mal contract. We now discuss the salient features of the optimal contract we character-
ize. We do so in the context of a public authority (the principal) persuading the public
1That is, the principal cannot make transfers, terminate the relationship, choose allocations or constraint
the agent’s choices.
2Public Health England was providing the number of new cases. As Public Health England is subject to
the Freedom of Information Act, the public had the opportunity to verify the accuracy of the numbers
reported. See https://coronavirus.data.gov.uk/about#england-cases, last accessed 10 July 2020.
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(the agent) to follow a specific recommendation. The main property of the optimal dis-
closure policy is its gradualism: information is gradually and continuously revealed over
time. At each period, it incentivizes the agent to follow the principal’s recommendation
with the promise of further information disclosure in the future.
We further illustrate the main properties of our policy - particularly how beliefs evolve
over time - with the help of Figure 1. Figure 1 plots four representative evolutions of the
agent’s belief about the “high” state – the state where the cost to incentivize the agent
relative to the benefit is the highest. In each panel, the grey region “OPT” indicates the
region at which following the recommendation is (statically) optimal. An arrow pointing
from one belief to another indicates how the agent revised his belief within the period
following a signal’s realization. Within a period, the agent takes a decision after the
beliefs have been revised. Arrows have different colors/patterns. At all beliefs at the
end of continuous black arrows, the agent follows the principal’s recommendation. At
all beliefs at the end of dotted magenta arrows, he does not (and chooses what is best
given his current belief).
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FIGURE 1. Evolution of actions and beliefs over time
The following are general properties of our optimal policy. The first observation to make
is that the agent continuously updates his belief until either he perfectly learns the state
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or following the recommendation becomes (statically) optimal. Moreover, if the agent
learns the state, he learns it in finite time. We provide an explicit characterization of
the priors at which the agent eventually learns the state.
Second, along the paths at which the agent follows the recommendation, his beliefs
about the “high” state are decreasing. Intuitively, the optimal contract exploits the
asymmetry in opportunity costs and lowers the perceived opportunity cost – hence mak-
ing it easier to incentivize the agent– by sometimes informing him when the opportunity
cost is high.3
Third, with the exception of panel (D), the policy does not disclose information to the
agent at the first period. Thus, adopting the definition of persuasion as the act of chang-
ing the agent’s beliefs prior to him making any decision, information disclosure rewards
the agent for following the recommendation, but does not persuade him in panels (A),
(B) and (C). Yet, as panel (D) illustrates, the policy sometimes needs to persuade the
agent. For instance, if the promise of full information disclosure at the next period
wouldn’t incentivize the agent, then persuading the agent is necessary, that is, the pol-
icy must generate a strictly positive value of information. However, there are other
circumstances at which persuading the agent may be necessary. Persuading the agent
may reduce sufficiently the perceived opportunity cost to compensate for the instanta-
neous loss.
Finally, with the exception of panel (B), the policy does not induce the agent to believe
that following the recommendation is optimal. This is markedly different from what we
would expect from the static analysis of Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011]. Intuitively, the
“static” policy is sub-optimal because it does not extract all the informational surplus it
creates, that is, it creates a strictly positive value of information, but does not extract
it all. (The participation constraint of the agent does not bind.) And even in panel (B),
the beliefs do not jump immediately to the “OPT” region. In fact, the belief process may
approach the “OPT” region only asymptotically.
Related literature. The paper is part of the literature on Bayesian persuasion, pio-
neered by Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011], and recently surveyed by Kamenica [2019].
The two most closely related papers are Ball [2019] and Ely and Szydlowski [2020]. In
3To be precise, under our policy, upon perceiving the signal “the opportunity cost is high,” the agent
learns that this is indeed true. However, the signal is not sent with probability one. This corresponds to
the arrows ending at 1.
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common with our paper, both papers study the optimal disclosure of information in dy-
namic games and show how the disclosure of information can be used as an incentive
tool. The observation that information can be used to incentivize agents is not new and
dates back to the literature on repeated games with information incomplete, e.g., Au-
mann et al. [1995]. See Garicano and Rayo [2017] and Fudenberg and Rayo [2019] for
some more recent papers exploring the role of information provision as an incentive tool.
The class of dynamic games studied differ considerably from one paper to another, which
makes comparisons difficult. In Ely and Szydlowski [2020], the agent has to repeatedly
decide whether to continue working on a project or to quit; quitting ends the game. The
principal aims at maximizing the number of periods the agent works on the project and
can only do so by disclosing information about the complexity of the project, modeled
as the number of periods required to complete the project. Thus, their dynamic game
is a quitting game, while ours is a repeated game. When the project is either easy
or difficult, the optimal disclosure policy initially persuades the agent that the task is
easy, so that he starts working. (Naturally, if the agent is sufficiently convinced that
the project is easy, there is no need to persuade him initially.) If the project is in fact
difficult, the policy then discloses it at a later date, when completing the project is now
within reach. A main difference with our optimal disclosure policy is that information
comes in lumps in Ely and Szydlowski [2020], i.e., information is disclosed only at the
initial period and at a later period, while information is continuously disclosed in our
model. In the words of Ely and Szydlowski, our policy continuously leads the agent
towards following the recommendation. Another main difference is as follows. In Ely
and Szydlowski, only when the promise of full information disclosure at a later date is
not enough to incentivize the agent to start working does the principal persuade the
agent initially. This is not so with our policy: the principal persuades the agent in a
larger set of circumstances. This initial persuasion reduces the cost of incentivizing the
agent in future periods.4
Ball [2019] studies a continuous time model of information provision, where the state
changes over time and payoffs are the ones of the quadratic example of Crawford and
4See Orlov et al. [2019] and Smolin [2018] for two other papers on quitting games and information dis-
closure. To illustrate the difficulties of comparing models, Orlov et al. [2019] consider a quitting game,
where the principal also aims at delaying the quitting time as far as possible. The quitting time is the
time at which the agent decides to exercise an option, which has different values to the principal and the
agent. The principal chooses a disclosure policy informing the agent about the option’s value. The optimal
disclosure policy is to fully reveal the state with some delay. (Note that the principal is referred to as
the agent in their work.) This policy is not optimal in Ely and Szydlowski [2020]. Seemingly innocuous
differences in models have important consequences.
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Sobel [1982]. Ball shows that the optimal disclosure policy requires the sender to dis-
close the current state at a later date, with the delay shrinking over time. The main
difference between his work and ours is the persistence of the state (also, we consider
two different classes of games). When the state is fully persistent, as in Ely and Szyd-
lowski [2020] and our model, full information disclosure with delay is not optimal in
general. (See Example 1.)
2. THE PROBLEM
A principal and an agent interact over an infinite number of periods, indexed by t ∈
{1, 2, . . . }. At the first stage, before the interaction starts, the principal learns a payoff-
relevant state ω ∈ Ω = {ω0, ω1}, while the agent remains uninformed. The prior prob-
ability of ω is p0(ω) > 0. At each period t, the principal sends a signal s ∈ S and, upon
observing the signal s, the agent takes decision a ∈ A. The sets A and S are finite.
The cardinality of S is as large as necessary for the principal to be unconstrained in his
signaling.5
We assume that there exists a∗ ∈ A such that the principal’s payoff is strictly positive
whenever a∗ is chosen and zero, otherwise. The principal’s payoff function is thus v :
A× Ω→ R, with v(a∗, ω0) > 0, v(a∗, ω1) > 0 and v(a, ω0) = v(a, ω1) = 0 for all a ∈ A \ {a∗}.
The agent’s payoff function is u : A× Ω→ R. The (common) discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1).
We write At−1 for A× · · · × A︸ ︷︷ ︸
t−1 times
and St−1 for S × · · · × S︸ ︷︷ ︸
t−1 times
, with generic elements at and st,
respectively. A behavioral strategy for the principal is a collection of maps (τt)t, with
τt : A
t−1 × St−1 × Ω→ ∆(S). Similarly, a behavioral strategy for the agent is a collection
of maps (σt)t with σt : At−1 × St−1 × S → ∆(A).
We write V(τ, σ) for the principal’s payoff and U(τ, σ) for the agent’s payoff under the
strategy profile (σ, τ). The objective is to characterize the maximal payoff the principal
achieves if he commits to a strategy τ , that is,
sup
(τ,σ)
V(τ, σ),
subject to
U(τ, σ) ≥ U(τ, σ′),
for all σ′.
5From Makris and Renou [2020], it is enough to have the cardinality of S as large as the cardinality of A.
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Several comments are worth making. First, we interpret the strategy the principal com-
mits to as a contract specifying, as a function of the state, the information to be disclosed
at each history of realized signals and actions. That is, the contract specifies a statisti-
cal experiment at each history of realized signals and states. The principal chooses the
contract prior to learning the state. An alternative interpretation is that neither the
principal nor the agent know the state, but the principal has the ability to conduct sta-
tistical experiments contingent on past signals and actions. We can partially dispense
with the commitment assumption. Indeed, since the choices of statistical experiments
are observable, we can construct strategies that incentivize the principal to implement
the specified statistical experiments.6 Second, the only additional information the agent
obtains each period is the outcome of the statistical experiment. Third, the state is fully
persistent and the principal perfectly monitors the action of the agent. Finally, the only
instrument available to the principal is information. The principal can neither remu-
nerate the agent nor terminate the relationship nor allocate different tasks to the agent.
We purposefully make all these assumptions to address our main question of interest:
what is the optimal way to incentivize the agent with information only?
Example 1. Throughout the paper, we illustrate most of our results with the help of the
following example. The agent has three possible actions a0, a1 and a∗, with a0 (resp., a1)
the agent’s optimal action when the state is ω0 (resp., ω1). The prior probability of ω1 is
1/3 and the discount factor is 1/2. The per-period payoffs are in Table 1, with the first
coordinate corresponding to the principal payoff.
TABLE 1. Payoff table of Example 1
a0 a1 a
∗
ω0 0, 1 0, 0 1, 1/2
ω1 0, 0 0, 2 1, 1/2
We start with few preliminary observations. First, regardless of the agent’s belief, action
a∗ is never optimal. Second, if the agent knew the state, he would choose a0 (resp., a1) in
state ω0 (resp., ω1), resulting in an expected payoff of 4/3. Third, the opportunity cost of
playing a∗ is the highest when the state is ω1, i.e., u(a1, ω1)−u(a∗, ω1) > u(a0, ω0)−u(a∗, ω0).
It is harder to incentivize the agent to play a∗ when he is more confident that the state
is ω1. As we shall see, the optimal policy exploits this property.
We now consider some simple strategies the principal may commit to. To start with, as-
sume that the principal commits to disclose information at the initial stage only. Clearly,
6The simplest such strategy is to have the agent play a 6= a∗ in all future periods after a deviation.
8 WEI ZHAO, CLAUDIO MEZZETTI, LUDOVIC RENOU, AND TRISTAN TOMALA
since a∗ is never optimal, the principal’s payoff is 0. The principal must condition his
information disclosure on the agent’s actions. The simplest such disclosure policy is to
“reward” the agent with full information disclosure for playing a∗ sufficiently often at
the beginning of the relationship, say up to period T ∗. Note that if the agent deviates,
the harshest punishment the principal can impose is to withhold all information in all
subsequent periods, inducing a normalized expected payoff of 2/3. We are thus looking
for the largest T ∗ such that
(1− δ)
(
1
2
(
δ0 + δ1 + · · ·+ δT ∗−1)+ 4
3
(
δT
∗
+ . . .
)) ≥ 2
3
,
With such a simple strategy, T ∗ = bln(5)/ ln(2)c = 2 and the principal’s payoff is 3/4.
There is yet another simple strategy the principal can commit to. The principal can
commit to a “recursive” policy, where he fully discloses the state with probability α at
period t (and withhold all information with the complementary probability) if the agent
plays a∗ at period t − 1. (Again if the agent deviates, the harshest punishment is to
withhold all information in all subsequent periods.) Thus, if we write V (resp., U ) for the
principal (resp., agent) payoff, the best recursive policy is to choose α so as to maximize
V =
1
2
1 +
1
2
(1− α)V,
subject to
U =
1
2
(1
2
)
+
1
2
[
(1− α)U + α4
3
]
≥ 2
3
.
The principal’s best payoff is V = 4/5 with α = 1/4. The “recursive” policy does better
than the policy of fully disclosing the state with delay. Intuitively, the “recursive” policy
performs better because it makes it possible to incentivize the agent to play a discounted
number of periods slightly larger than 2. (In continuous time, both policies would be
equivalent.) As full information with delay plays an important role in the work of Ball
[2019] and Orlov et al. [2019], we will compare the recursive policy with our optimal
policy later on. For now, it suffices to say that it is not optimal in Example 1.
3. OPTIMAL CONTRACTS
This section fully characterizes the optimal contract and discusses its most salient prop-
erties. We first start with a recursive formulation.
3.1. A recursive formulation. The first step in deriving an optimal contract is to re-
formulate the principal’s problem as a recursive problem. To do so, we introduce two
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state variables. First, it is well-known that classical dynamic contracting problems ad-
mit recursive formulations if one introduces promised continuation payoffs as a state
variable and imposes promise-keeping constraints, e.g., Spear and Srivastava [1987].
The second state variable we need to introduce is beliefs. We now turn to a formal
reformulation of the problem.7
We first need some additional notation. For any p ∈ ∆(Ω), we let u(a, p) := ∑ω p(ω)u(a, ω)
be the agent’s expected payoff of choosing a when his belief is p, m(p) := maxa∈A u(a, p)
be the agent’s best payoff when his belief is p, and M(p) :=
∑
ω p(ω) maxa∈A u(a, ω) be
the agent’s expected payoff if he learns the state prior to choosing an action. It is worth
noting that m is a piece-wise linear convex function, that M is linear and that m(p) ≤
M(p) for all p. Similarly, we let v(a, p) be the principal’s payoff when the agent chooses a
and the principal’s belief is p. Finally, let P := {p ∈ [0, 1] : m(p) = u(a∗, p)}, be the set of
beliefs at which a∗ is optimal. If non-empty, the set P is the closed interval [p, p].
Let W ⊆ [0, 1] × R such that (p, w) ∈ W if and only if w ∈ [m(p),M(p)]. Throughout, we
restrict attention to functions V : W → R, with the interpretation that V (p, w) is the
principal’s payoff if he promises a continuation payoff of w to the agent when the agent’s
current belief is p.
The principal’s maximal payoff is V ∗(p0,m(p0)), where V ∗ is the unique fixed point of the
contraction T , defined by
T (V )(p, w) :=

max(
(λs,(ps,ws),as)∈[0,1]×W×A
)
s∈S
∑
s∈S λs[(1− δ)v(as, ps) + δV (ps, ws)],
subject to:
(1− δ)u(as, ps) + δws ≥ m(ps),∑
s∈S λs[(1− δ)u(as, ps) + δws] ≥ w,∑
s∈S λsps = p,
∑
s∈S λs = 1.
We briefly comment on the maximization program. The first constraint is an incentive
constraint: the agent must have an incentive to play as when ws is the agent’s promised
7A nearly identical reformulation has already appeared in Ely [2015], one of the working version of Ely
[2017]. We remind the reader that Ely [2017] analyzes the interaction between a long-run principal
and a sequence of short-run agents. (See also Renault et al. [2017].) While discussing the extension of
his model to the interaction between a long-run principal and a long-run agent, Ely [2015] has derived
a recursive reformulation nearly identical to ours. However, he didn’t go further. We start from the
recursive formulation and use it to derive an optimal policy. See Section A.2 for a detailed comparison of
both formulations.
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continuation payoff and ps the agent’s belief. To understand the right-hand side, ob-
serve that the agent can always play a static best-reply to any belief he has so that his
expected payoff must be at least m(ps) when his current belief is ps.8 Conversely, if the
contract specifies action as and the agent does not execute that action, the contract can
specify no further information revelation, in which case the agent’s payoff is at most
m(ps). Therefore, m(ps) is the agent’s min-max payoff. The second constraint is the
promise-keeping constraint: if the principal promises the continuation payoff w at a pe-
riod, the contract must honor that promise in subsequent periods. The third constraint
states that the policy selects a splitting of p, that is, a distribution over posteriors with
expectation p.
Throughout, we slightly abuse notation and denote by τ a policy, that is, a function from
W to ([0, 1]×W×A)|S|. A policy is feasible if it specifies a feasible tuple ((λs, (ps, ws), as))s∈S
for each (p, w), i.e., a tuple satisfying the constraints of the maximization problem T (V )(p, w).
Two important observations are worth making. First, for any function V , T (V ) is a
concave function in (p, w). Concavity reflects the fact that the more information the
principal discloses, the harder it is to reward the agent in the future. Second, T (V ) is
a decreasing function in w, that is, the more the principal promises to the agent, the
harder it is to incentivize the agent to play a∗.9 We will repeatedly make use of these
two properties, which we formally record in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The value function V ∗ is concave in both arguments and decreasing in
w.
Proposition 1 together with the recursive formulation has a number of additional im-
plications. First, there is at most one signal s at which the principal recommends the
agent to play a∗. Moreover, whenever the principal recommends a∗, the agent is indif-
ferent between obeying the recommendation or deviating. In other words, the promised
continuation payoff does not leave rents to the agent. Second, if the principal does not
recommend a∗ at a period, then the principal never recommends a∗ at a subsequent pe-
riod, that is, the principal’s continuation value is zero. In other words, as soon as an
action other than a∗ is played, the principal stops incentivizing the agent to play a∗.
8More precisely, if the agent’s belief at period τ is pτ , he obtains the payoff m(pτ ) by playing a static best-
reply. Since the function m is convex and beliefs follow a martingale, his expected payoff is therefore at
least (1− δ)∑τ ′≥τ δτ ′−τE[m(pτ ′)|Fτ ] ≥ m(pτ ), where Fτ is the agent’s filtration at period τ .
9A real-valued function f is increasing (resp., strictly increasing) if x ≥ y implies that f(x) ≥ f(y) (resp.,
f(x) > f(y)). The function f is (resp., strictly) decreasing if −f is (resp., strictly) increasing.
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Finally, if the principal induces the posterior ps while recommending the action as and
promising the continuation payoff ws, the principal should not have an incentive to fur-
ther disclose information in that period. The following proposition formally states these
three implications.
Proposition 2. For all (p, w), there exists a solution (λs, ps, ws, as)s∈S to T (V ∗)(p, w) such
that
(i): There exists at most one signal s∗ ∈ S such that λs∗ > 0 and as∗ = a∗. Moreover,
(1− δ)u(as∗ , ps∗) + δws∗ = m(ps∗).
(ii): For all s ∈ S such that λs > 0 and as 6= a∗, V ∗(ps, ws) = 0.
(iii): For all s ∈ S such that λs > 0, we have
(1− δ) v (as, ps) + δV ∗ (ps, ws) = V ∗ (ps, (1− δ)u (as, ps) + δws) .
Proposition 2 states key properties that an optimal policy possesses. We conclude this
section with a partial converse, that is, we state properties that guarantee optimality of
a policy. To do so, we need to introduce two additional notation. We first let Q1 be the set
of beliefs at which the agent has an incentive to play a∗ if he is promised full information
disclosure at the next period, that is,
Q1 := {p ∈ [0, 1] : (1− δ)u(a∗, p) + δM(p) ≥ m(p)}.
If Q1 is empty, then all policies are optimal as the principal can never incentivize the
agent to play a∗. If Q1 is non-empty, then it is a closed interval [q1, q1]. Note that q1 = 0
if and only if a∗ is optimal at p = 0. For a graphical illustration, see Figure 2.
m(·)
M(·)
u(a∗, ·)
q1
m(q1)
1
m(1)
(1− δ)u(a∗, ·) + δM(·)
q1
FIGURE 2. Construction of the set Q1
Second, we write w(p) ∈ [m(p),M(p)] for the continuation payoff that makes the agent
indifferent between playing action a∗ and receiving the continuation payoff w(p) in the
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future, and playing a best reply to the belief p forever, that is, w(p) solves:
(1− δ)u(a∗, p) + δw(p) = m(p).
Theorem 1. Consider any feasible policy inducing the value function V˜ . If V˜ is concave
in both arguments, decreasing in w and satisfies
V˜ (p,m(p)) ≥ (1− δ)v(a∗, p) + δV˜ (p,w(p)),
for all p ∈ Q1, then the policy is optimal.
Proof. We argue that V˜ is the fixed point of the operator T , hence V˜ = V ∗. Let (λs, ps, ws, as)s∈S
be a solution to the maximization problem T (V˜ )(p, w). We first start with the following
observation. Consider any s such that as 6= a∗. We have
(1− δ)v(as, ps) + δV˜ (ps, ws) = δV˜ (ps, ws) ≤ V˜ (ps, ws) ≤ V˜ (ps, (1− δ)u(as, ps) + δws),
where the last inequality follows from the fact that V˜ is decreasing in w and m(ps) ≤
(1− δ)u(as, ps) + δws ≤ (1− δ)m(ps) + δws ≤ ws.
Consider now any s such that as = a∗. Since (λs, ps, ws, as)s∈S is feasible, we have that
(1− δ)u(a∗, ps) + δws ≥ m(ps),
hence ps ∈ Q1 and, therefore,
V˜ (ps,m(ps)) ≥ (1− δ)v(a∗, ps) + δV˜
(
ps,
−(1− δ)u(a∗, ps) +m(ps)
δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
w(ps)
)
.
The concavity of V˜ implies that
V˜ (ps, (1− δ)u(a∗, ps) + δws)− V˜ (ps,m(ps)) ≥ δ
[
V˜ (ps, ws)− V˜
(
ps,w(ps)
)]
,
where we use the identity (1− δ)u(a∗, ps) + δws −m(ps) = δ(ws −w(ps)) and observation
(a) about concave functions in Section A.1.
Combining the above two inequalities implies that
V˜ (ps, (1− δ)u(a∗, ps) + δws) ≥ (1− δ)v(a∗, ps) + δV˜ (ps, ws).
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It follows that
T (V˜ )(p, w) =
∑
s∈S
λs
[
(1− δ)v(as, ps) + δV˜ (ps, ws)
]
≤
∑
s∈S
λs
[
V˜ (ps, (1− δ)u(as, ps) + δws)
]
≤ V˜
(∑
s∈S
λsps,
∑
s∈S
λs((1− δ)u(as, ps) + δws))
)
≤ V˜ (p, w),
where the second inequality follows from the concavity of V˜ and the third inequality
from V˜ being decreasing in w.
Conversely, since the policy inducing V˜ is feasible, we must have that T (V˜ )(p, w) ≥
V˜ (p, w) for all (p, w). This completes the proof. 
3.2. An optimal policy. The objective of this section is to define a policy, which we
later prove to be optimal. Throughout, the number p ∈ [0, 1] refers to the probability
of ω1. We denote ap a maximizer of u(·, p). Without loss of generality, assume that
v(a∗,0)
v(a∗,1) ≥ m(0)−u(a
∗,0)
m(1)−u(a∗,1) , that is, the principal’s benefit of a
∗ in state ω0 relative to state ω1 is
higher than the agent’s opportunity cost in state ω0 relative to state ω1. (A symmetric
argument applies if the reverse inequality holds.) Observe that if a∗ is optimal for the
agent at p = 1, i.e., 1 ∈ P , then a∗ is also optimal at p = 0 and, consequently, P = [0, 1],
i.e., a∗ is optimal at all beliefs. In what follows, we exclude this trivial case and assume
that 1 /∈ P .
Define the functions λ : W → [0, 1] and ϕ : W → [0, 1], with (λ(p, w), ϕ(p, w)) the unique
solution to: p
w
 = λ(p, w)
 ϕ(p, w)
m(ϕ(p, w))
+ (1− λ(p, w))
 1
m(1)
 . (1)
for all w > m(p), and λ(p,m(p)), ϕ(p,m(p))) = (1, p). Geometrically, the solution (ϕ(p, w),m(ϕ(p, w))
is the unique intersection between the line connecting (p, w) and (1,m(1)) and the graph
of m. See Figure 3 for an illustration. Note that both functions are continuous.
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m(·)
M(·)
p
w
1
m(1)
ϕ(p, w)
m(ϕ(p, w))
FIGURE 3. Construction of λ and ϕ
We now define a family of policies (τq)q∈[q1,q1] and show later the existence of q∗ ∈ [q1, q1]
such that the policy τq∗ is optimal. For each q ∈ [q1, q1], there are four regions to consider:
W1q :=
{
(p, w) : p ∈ [0, q1), w ≤ q
1 − p
q1
m(0) +
p
q1
m(q1)
}
,
W2q :=
{
(p, w) : p ∈ (q, 1], 1− p
1− qm(q) +
p− q
1− qm(1) < w ≤
1− p
1− q1m(q
1) +
p− q1
1− q1m(1)
}
⋃{
(p, w) : p ∈ [q1, q], w ≤ 1− p
1− q1m(q
1) +
p− q1
1− q1m(1)
}
,
W3q :=
{
(p, w) : p ∈ (q, 1], w ≤ 1− p
1− qm(q) +
p− q
1− qm(1)
}
,
W4q := W \ (W1q ∪W2q ∪W3q ).
The four regions partition the set W. The first region corresponds to the points (p, w)
below the line connecting (0,m(0)) to (q1,m(q1)). The second region corresponds to the
points (p, w) below the line connecting (q1,m(q1)) and (1,m(1)) but above the line connect-
ing (q,m(q)) and (1,m(1)). The third region corresponds (p, w) below the line connecting
(q,m(q)) and (1,m(1)), while the fourth region corresponds to all other points. Figure 4
illustrates the four regions with W1q the black region, W2q the region with vertical lines,
W3q the gray region, andW4q the region with north west lines.
m(·)
M(·)
q1 p
w
q1q
FIGURE 4. The regionsW1,W2,W3 andW4.
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It is worth observing that the regions W1q and W4q do not depend on the parameter q,
while the other two do. The policy τq differs from one region to another, as we now
explain.
If (p, w) ∈ W1q , the policy splits p into 0 and q1 with probability q
1−p
q1−0 and
p−0
q1−0 , respectively.
Conditional on 0, the policy recommends a0 and promises a continuation payoff of m(0).
Conditional on q1, the policy recommends a∗ and promises a continuation payoff of w(q1).
If (p, w) ∈ W2q , the policy splits p into ϕ(p, w) and 1 with probability λ(p, w) and 1−λ(p, w),
respectively. Conditional on ϕ(p, w), the policy recommends action a∗ and promises a
continuation payoff of w(ϕ(p, w)). Conditional on 1, the policy recommends action a1 and
promises a continuation payoff of m(1).
If (p, w) ∈ W3q , the policy splits p into q and 1 with probability 1−p1−q and p−q1−q , respectively.
Conditional on 1, the policy recommends a1 and promises a continuation payoff of m(1).
Conditional on q, the policy recommends a∗ and promises a continuation payoff of w(q).
If (p, w) ∈ W4q , the policy splits p into 0, q1, and 1 with probability λ0, λq1 and λ1,
respectively. Conditional on 0 (resp., 1), the policy recommends action a0 (resp, a1)
and promises a continuation payoff of m(0) (resp., m(1)). Conditional on q1, the pol-
icy recommends action a∗ and promises a continuation payoff of w(q1). The probabilities
(λ0, λq1 , λ1) ∈ R+ × R+ × R+ are the unique solution to:
λ0

0
m(0)
1
+ λq1

q1
m(q1)
1
+ λ1

1
m(1)
1
 =

p
w
1
 .
A solution exists sinceW4q is the convex hull of (0,m(0)), (q1,m(q1)) and (1,m(1)).
This completes the description of the policy. Intuitively, in regions W1q and W3q , the
policy generates a strictly positive information value, i.e., the policy leaves rents to the
agent. Clearly, this is needed when even the promise of full information disclosure
at the next period does not incentivize the agent to play a∗ even once, i.e., when his
belief is in [0, 1] \ Q1. As we shall see later, this is even true for some beliefs in Q1
as a way to minimizes the cost of incentivizing the agent relative to the benefit to the
principal. In regionW2q , the policy does not leave the rent to the agent and continuously
incentivize him to play a∗ with the promise of future information disclosure. This is
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the most important region. Finally, region W4q is mostly for completeness. The policy
enters it only at beliefs sufficiently close to q1. For instance, in the introductory Figure
1, panel (D) represents the evolution of beliefs starting from a prior belief in the region
W3q , transitioning to the regionW2q at the next period and staying there for three periods
and transitioning then to the region W4q . To illustrate further the policy, we revisit our
running example.
Example 1 (continued). We have that M(p) = 1 + p, m(p) = max(1− p, 2p) and w(p) =
2 max(2p, 1 − p) − (1/2). Therefore, Q1 = [1/6, 1/2]. Assume that q = 1/2 (we will soon
show that this is optimal in this example). Remember that 1/3 is the prior probability
of ω1 and δ = 1/2. Let us start with the pair (p,m(p)) = (1/3, 2/3), which is in region
W21/2. The policy recommends a∗ to the agent and promises a continuation payoff of
w(1/3) = 5/6. The next state is therefore (1/3, 5/6), which is again in W21/2. If the agent
had been obedient, the policy then splits the prior probability 1/3 into 3/11 and 1 with
probability 22/24 and 2/24, respectively. To see this, note that we indeed have:
13
5
6
 = 22
24
 311
m( 3
11
)
+ 2
24
 1
m(1)
 .
Conditional on the posterior 3/11, the policy recommends a∗ to the agent and promises
a continuation payoff of w(3/11) = 21/22. Conditional on the posterior 1, the policy
recommends a1 and promises a continuation payoff ofm(1) = 2. Therefore, the next state
is either (3/11, 21/22) or (1, 2), with the former again inW21/2. In the latter case, the policy
yet again recommends a1 and a continuation payoff of 2. In the former case, the policy
splits 3/11 into 7/39 and 1, with probability 39/44 and 5/44, respectively. Conditional on
the posterior 7/39, the policy recommends a∗ to the agent and promises a continuation
payoff of w(7/39) = 89/78. Conditional on the posterior 1, the policy recommends a1 and
promises a continuation payoff of m(1) = 2. Finally, at the state (7/39, 89/78), which is in
regionW41/2, the policy does a penultimate split of 7/39 into 0, 1/6 and 1 with probability
113/156 18/156 and 25/156, respectively. Conditional on the posterior 1/6, the policy
recommends a∗ and promises a continuation payoff of 7/6, i.e., full information disclosure
at that the next period. Thus, the policy fully discloses the state in finite time to the
agent. See Figure 5 for the evolution of the beliefs at the beginning of each period. At all
beliefs other than 0 and 1, the agent is recommended to play a∗. The principal’s expected
payoff is 1285/1536, i.e., about 0.83.
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1
3
1
3
1
3
11
1
7
39
1
1
6
0
1
0
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4 t = 5
FIGURE 5. Evolution of the beliefs.
3.3. Construction of q∗ and optimality. Let Vq : W → R be the value function in-
duced by the policy τq. Note that for all q, Vq(1,m(1)) = 0 since a∗ is not optimal at p = 1
and Vq(0,m(0)) = 0 if a∗ is not optimal at p = 0 (resp., = v(a∗, 0)) if a∗ is optimal at p = 0).
Also, Vq(q1,m(q1)) = (1− δ)v(a∗, q1) if q1 > 0 (resp., Vq(0,m(0)) = v(a∗, 0) if q1 = 0, since a∗
is then optimal at p = 0). Therefore, any two policies τq and τq′ induce the same values
at all (p, w) ∈ W1q ∪W4q =W1q′ ∪W4q′. (Remember that the regionsW1q andW4q do not vary
with q, see Figure 4.)
Similarly, any two policies τq and τq′ induce the same values at all (p, w) ∈ W2min(q,q′).
In particular, τq and τq1 induce the same values at all (p, w) ∈ W \ W3q . Finally, at all
(p, w) ∈ W3q , Vq(p, w) = 1−p1−qVq(q,m(q)) = 1−p1−qVq1(q,m(q)). (See Section A.4 for more details.)
We are now ready to state our main result. Let
q∗ = sup
{
p ∈ [q1, q1] : Vq1(p,m(p)) ≥ Vq1(p, w) for all w
}
.
Theorem 2. The policy τq∗ is optimal and, therefore, Vq∗ = V ∗.
To understand the role of q∗, recall that for all p ∈ [q∗, 1], the policy leaves rents to the
agent.10 To minimize the rents left to the agent, we therefore would like to have q∗ as
high as possible, i.e, equals to q1. However, Vq1(·,m(·)) is not guaranteed to be concave in
p, a necessary condition for optimality. To see this, consider any pair (p, p′) ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1]
and α ∈ [0, 1]. We have
αV ∗(p,m(p)) + (1− α)V ∗(p′,m(p′)) ≤ V ∗(αp+ (1− α)p′, αm(p) + (1− α)m(p′))
≤ V ∗(αp+ (1− α)p′,m(αp+ (1− α)p′)),
10I.e., the agent is promised a payoff of 1−p1−q∗m(q
∗) + p−q
∗
1−q∗m(1) > m(p).
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where the first inequality follows from the concavity of V ∗ in both arguments and the
second from V ∗ decreasing in w and the convexity of m. The optimal choice of q∗ is thus
the largest q, which guarantees Vq(·,m(·)) to be concave.
More precisely, as we show in Section A.5, the definition of q∗ guarantees that Vq∗ is
concave in both arguments and decreasing in w, so that Vq∗(·,m(·)) is a concave function
of p. We also prove that Vq∗(p,m(p)) ≥ Vq1(p,m(p)) for all p. Since it is clearly the smallest
such function, Vq∗ is the concavification of Vq1. In particular, q∗ = q1 if Vq1(·,m(·)) is
already concave. Figure 6 illustrates the concavification in the context of Example 1.
FIGURE 6. The concavification of Vq1(·,m(·)) in Example 1
The policy we construct leaves rents to the agent for all priors in [0, q1) ∪ (q∗, 1], that is,
the (ex-ante) participation constraint does not bind. It is quite natural for all priors in
[0, 1] \ Q1 since the agent cannot be incentivized to play a∗ even once. In the language
of Ely and Szydlowski [2020], “the goalposts need to move,” that is, one needs to dis-
close information at the ex-ante stage to persuade the agent to play a∗. However, our
policy also leaves rents for all priors in (q∗, q1]. The intuitive reason is that the initial
information disclosure reduces the cost of incentivizing the agent in subsequent periods
sufficiently enough to compensate for the initial loss. (When the realized posterior is 1,
the agent never plays a∗, thus creating the loss.)
3.4. Properties of the policy. The policy we construct has a number of noteworthy
features, which we now explore.
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Information disclosure. The policy discloses information gradually over time, with
beliefs evolving until either the agent learns the state or believes that a∗ is (statically)
optimal. We can be more specific. Let Q∞ = [p, q∞], with q∞ the solution to
m(q∞) = (1− δ)u(a∗, q∞) + δ
(
1− q∞
1− p m(p) +
q∞ − p
1− p m(1)
)
,
if P is non-empty, andQ∞ = ∅, otherwise. (Remember that P is the set of beliefs at which
a∗ is statically optimal.) Note that P ⊆ Q∞. See Figure 7 for a graphical illustration.
m(p)
u(a∗, p)
(1− δ)u(a∗, p) + δ
(
1−p
1−pm(p) +
p−p
1−pm(1)
)
q∞pp p
FIGURE 7. Construction of q∞
Intuitively, the set Q∞ has the “fixed-point property,” that is, if one starts with a prior
p ∈ Q∞, then the belief ϕ(p,w(p)) ∈ Q∞. Since ϕ(p,w(p)) ≤ p (with a strict inequality
if p /∈ P ), we thus a decreasing sequence of beliefs converging to an element in P . See
panel (B) of Figure 1 for an an illustration.
At all priors in [0, 1] \ Q∞, there exists Tδ < ∞ such that the belief process is absorbed
in the degenerate beliefs 0 or 1 after at most Tδ periods. In other words, agent learns
the state for sure in finite time. The number of periods Tδ corresponds to the maximal
number of periods the agent can be incentivized to play a∗. (We provide an explicit
computation in Section A.4.) In Example 1, it is 4. Moreover, the date Tδ is increasing in
δ and converges to +∞ as δ converges to 1. (Note that it is also uniform in that it does
not depend on p ∈ [0, 1] \Q∞.)
At all priors in Q∞, the belief process is either absorbed in 1 or in some p ∈ P ; the process
may be absorbed only asymptotically.
The economics of our policy. We now provide some economic insights as to why our
policy is optimal. From Makris and Renou [2020], we can view the principal’s problem
as selecting among the set of Bayes correlated equilibria of the decision problem the
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agent faces an equilibrium maximizing his payoff. At a Bayes correlated equilibrium,
an omniscient mediator makes periodic recommendations of actions to the agent. The
recommendation at period t depends on all past recommendations, past actions and
payoff-relevant states. At an equilibrium, the agent has an incentive to be obedient,
provided he has been in the past. Denote pit(a|at−1, ω) the probability of recommending
action a conditional on the profiles of past recommendations (and actions) at−1 and the
state ω, and let pit−1(at−1|ω) = pi1(a1|ω)× pi2(a2|a1, ω)× · · · × pit−1(at−1|at−1, ω).11
At a Bayes correlated equilibrium, the principal’s payoff is
(1− δ)
∑
ω
p0(ω)
(∑
t
∑
at−1
δt−1pit(a∗|at−1, ω)pit−1(at−1|ω)
)
v(a∗, ω) = λ∗v∗(a∗, p∗),
where
λ∗ := (1− δ)
∑
ω
p0(ω)
(∑
t
∑
at−1
δt−1pit(a∗|at−1, ω)pit−1(at−1|ω)
)
is the discounted probability of recommending action a∗ and
p∗ :=
(1− δ)∑t∑at−1,a∗ δt−1pit(a∗|at−1, ω1)pit−1(at−1|ω1)
λ∗
,
is the average discounted probability of ω1 when a∗ is recommended. Notice that p∗
cannot be lower than q1 since the agent would never play a∗ for lower beliefs. Similarly,
let p? be the average discounted probability of ω1 when a∗ is not recommended. Since the
belief process is a martingale, λ∗p∗ + (1− λ∗)p? = p0.
We now turn our attention to the agent’s expected payoff. Since the agent cannot obtain
more than maxa∈A u(a, ω) whenever he does not play a∗, his expected payoff is bounded
from above by:
λ∗u(a∗, p∗) + (1− λ∗)M(p?) = λ∗(u(a∗, p∗)−M(p∗)) +M(p0).
Moreover, since the agent’s payoff must be at least m(p0), there exists a positive number
c ≥ 0 such that
λ∗(u(a∗, p∗)−M(p∗)) +M(p0)− c = m(p0).
The number c captures two effects. First, the optimal solution may leave some rents to
the agent, so that the agent’s payoff is m(p0) + c1 for some c1 ≥ 0. Second, the agent’s
payoff may be bounded away from the upper bound by some positive number c2 > 0. It
follows that c = c1 + c2.
11More accurately, we should write pit(a|at−1, aˆt−1, ω), where the second component aˆt−1 corresponds to
past recommendations. Since our discussion focuses on the equilibrium path, i.e., when at−1 = aˆt−1, the
simpler notation suffices.
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We can then rewrite the principal’s expected payoff as:
v(a∗, p∗)
M(p∗)− u(a∗, p∗)(M(p0)−m(p0)− c).
The first term captures the average benefit of incentivizing the agent to play a∗ relative
to the cost. Since v(a
∗,0)
v(a∗,1) ≥ m(0)−u(a
∗,0)
m(1)−u(a∗,1) , it is decreasing in p
∗. Ceteris paribus, the lower
the average belief at which the agent plays a∗, the higher the principal’s expected payoff.
In a sense, this term represents the “debt” the principal accumulates over time as the
agent repeatedly plays a∗. The second term captures how the principal repays his debt
with his only instrument: information. The term M(p0)−m(p0) is the maximal value of
information the principal can create. Ceteris paribus, the principal’s payoff is decreasing
in c, that is, the best is to leave no rents to the agent and to create as much information
as necessary to repay the agent. Notice that c = 0 is only achieved by both leaving no
rents to the agent and fully informing the agent of the state (i.e., whenever the agent
does not play a∗, his belief is either 0 or 1).
In general, the principal needs to trade-off a lower p∗ for a lower c. It is worth noting
that our policy guarantees c = 0 for all p0 ∈ [q1, q∗]. The principal uses to the full
extent possible the information available to him. For p0 ∈ [0, q1], it is then clear why our
policy of splitting p0 into 0(= p?) and q1(= p∗) is optimal. It minimizes the average cost
of incentivizing the agent to play a∗, attains the upper bound for the agent’s expected
payoff since M(0) = m(0), i.e., c2 = 0, and leaves as little rents as possible. A similar
argument applies to p0 ∈ [q1, 1]. When p0 ∈ (q∗, q1], the policy leaves strictly positive
rents to the agent, i.e., c1 > 0. The gain is to reduce the average cost of incentivizing a∗
in the future, which out-weights the cost.
Non-uniqueness and comparison with the KG’s policy. The policy is not always
uniquely optimal. We demonstrate the non-uniqueness with the help of a simple ex-
ample and then discuss how our policy compares with the KG’s policy (for Kamenica-
Gentzkow’s policy).
Example 2. The agent has two possible actions a0 and a1, with a0 (resp., a1) the agent’s
optimal action when the state is ω0 (resp., ω1). The principal wants to induce a0 as often
as possible, i.e., a∗ = a0. The discount factor is 1/2. The payoffs are in Table 2, with the
first coordinate corresponding to the principal’s payoff.
In Example 2, we have that: m(p) = max(1 − p, p), M(p) = 1 and u(a∗, p) = 1 − p. Thus,
a∗ is optimal for all p ∈ P = [0, 1/2]. Moreover, Q1 = [0, 2/3] and w(p) = 3p − 1 for
p ∈ (1/2, 2/3].
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TABLE 2. Payoff table of Example 2
a0 a1
ω0 1, 1 0, 0
ω1 1, 0 0, 1
We now provide an explicit characterization of the value function. We first compute the
value function Vq1(·,m(·)) and check whether it is concave. For p ∈ [0, 1/2], the policy
recommends a∗ and promises a continuation payoff of m(p). That is, since a∗ is optimal,
the principal does not need to incentivize the agent. For p ∈ (1/2, 2/3], the policy rec-
ommends a∗ and promises a continuation payoff of w(p). At (p,w(p)) with p ∈ (1/2, 2/3],
the policy splits p into ϕ(p,w(p)) and 1, with probability λ(p,w(p)) and 1 − λ(p,w(p))
respectively. (See Equation (1).)
We obtain that λ(p,w(p)) = (3−4p) and ϕ(p,w(p)) = 2−3p
3−4p . Note that ϕ(p,w(p)) =
2−3p
3−4p <
1
2
since p ∈ (1/2, 2/3]. After splitting p into ϕ(p,w(p)), the principal therefore obtains a
payoff of 1 in all subsequent periods. It follows that the principal’s expected payoff is
1
2
+
1
2
λ(p,w(p)) = 2(1− p).
Finally, if p ∈ (2/3, 1], the policy splits p into 2/3 and 1 with probability 3(1 − p) and
(1− 3(1− p)), respectively. The principal’s expected payoff is then
3(1− p)×
[1
2
+
1
2
λ(
2
3
,w(
2
3
))
]
= 3(1− p)× 2
(
1− 2
3
)
= 2(1− p).
So, the value function Vq1 induced by the policy τq1 is such Vq1(p,m(p)) = 1 for all
p ∈ [0, 1/2] and Vq1(p,m(p)) = 2(1 − p) for all p ∈ (1/2, 1]. Since it is concave in p, this
guarantees that q∗ = q1 and, thus, the policy is indeed optimal.
We now consider another policy, which we call the KG’s policy. The aim of the KG’s policy
is to persuade the agent to choose a∗ as often as possible by disclosing information at the
initial stage only. In other words, the KG’s policy uses information disclosure neither to
reward nor to punish the agent, but only to persuade. The best payoff the principal can
obtain with a KG’s policy is:
max
(λs,ps,as)
∑
s
λsv(as, ps),
subject to
∀s, u(as, ps) ≥ m(ps),and
∑
s
λsps = p.
In Example 2, the KG’s policy differs from our policy only when p ≥ 1/2, and consists
in splitting p into 1/2 and 1, with probability 2(1 − p) and 1 − 2(1 − p) respectively. The
CONTRACTING OVER PERSISTENT INFORMATION 23
KG’s policy induces the same value function as ours policy, hence is also optimal. We
now prove that this is not accidental.
Suppose that there are only two actions, a0 and a1, such that a0 (resp., a1) is optimal
at state ω0 (resp., ω1). The principal aims at implementing a0 as often as possible, i.e.,
a∗ = a0.12 Remember that a0 is optimal at all beliefs in [p, p]. Since a0 is optimal at 0,
p = 0. To streamline the exposition, assume that the prior p0 > p. (If p0 ≤ p, an optimal
policy is to never reveal any information.) It is then immediate to see that the KG’s
policy consists in splitting the prior p0 into p and 1, with probability 1−p01−p and 1 − 1−p01−p ,
respectively. Intuitively, the principal designs a binary experiment, with one signal
perfectly informing the agent that the state is ω1 and the other partially informing the
agent so that his posterior beliefs is p.
We can contrast the KG’s policy with our policy. Unlike the KG’s policy, our policy does
not reveal information to the agent at the first period, and only reveals information to
the agent if he plays a0. If the agent plays a0 at the first period, the policy splits p0 into
ϕ(p0,w(p0)) and 1 with probability λ(p0,w(p0)) and 1 − λ(p0,w(p0)), respectively. Note
that ϕ(p0,w(p0)) ≤ p since w(p0) ≥ m(p0). Thus, our policy guarantees that the agent
plays a∗ for sure at the first period. However, this comes at a cost: the principal needs
to reveal more information to the agent at the next period and, consequently, inducing
the agent to play a0 with a lower probability. Somewhat surprisingly, both policies are
optimal, regardless of the discount factor.
Corollary 1. If there are only two actions, then the KG’s policy is also optimal.
As Example 1 shows, the KG’s policy is not always optimal. Yet, we might wonder
whether this was due to a∗ being strictly dominated. The answer is negative, as the
next example shows.
Example 3. The agent has three possible actions a0, a1 and a∗, with a0 (resp., a1) the
agent’s optimal action when the state is ω0 (resp., ω1). The prior probability of ω1 is
1/12 and the discount factor is 1/2. The payoffs are in Table 3, with the first coordinate
corresponding to the principal’s payoff.
In Example 3, we have that: M(p) = 1 + p, m(p) = max(1 − p, 3/4, 2p), [p, p] = [1/4, 3/8]
and q1 = 1/12. It is straightforward to show that the KG policy consists in splitting the
12Recall that we assume that m(1)− u(a∗, 1) ≥ m(0)− u(a∗, 0). Thus, if a∗ = a1, then 0 = m(1)− u(a1, 1) ≥
m(0)− u(a1, 0) = u(a0, 0)− u(a1, 0) ≥ 0, i.e., a1 is also optimal when the agent believes that the state is ω0
with probability 1.
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TABLE 3. Payoff table of Example 3
a0 a1 a
∗
ω0 0, 1 0, 0 1, 3/4
ω1 0, 0 0, 2 1, 3/4
prior 1/12 into 0 and 1/4, inducing a payoff of 1/3.13 Note that the KG’s policy does not
create a strictly positive value of information, since (3/4)m(0) + (1/4)m(1/4) = m(1/12),
while ours does. Yet, our policy is optimal and induces a payoff of 1/2 (= (1− δ)v(a∗, q1)).
Comparison with the “recursive” policy. Finally, we compare our policy with the
“recursive” policy. Remember that the “recursive” policy is essentially equivalent to the
policy of fully disclosing the state with delay, a policy which plays a prominent role in
the work of Ball [2019] and Orlov et al. [2019].
We first compute the principal’s best payoff if he commits to the best “recursive” policy,
that is, when the principal promises to fully disclose the state with probability α at
period t+ 1 (and to withhold all information with the complementary probability) if the
agent plays a∗ at period t. To ease the exposition, we assume that a∗ is not optimal at
the belief p = 0.14 Assume that p ∈ Q1. The best recursive policy is thus solution to the
maximization problem:
V = max
α∈[0,1]
(1− δ)v(a∗, p) + δ(1− α)V,
subject to
U = (1− δ)u(a∗, p) + δ [αM(p) + (1− α)U ] ≥ m(p).
The optimal solution is
α∗ =
w(p)−m(p)
M(p)−m(p) =
1− δ
δ
m(p)− u(a∗, p)
M(p)−m(p) ,
inducing the value
(1− δ)
∑
t
δt
(
M(p)−w(p)
M(p)−m(p)
)t
v(a∗, p) =
M(p)−m(p)
M(p)− u(a∗, p)v(a
∗, p).
The formula has a natural interpretation. Whenever the agent is recommended to play
a∗, no information has been revealed yet, so that the maximal value of information the
principal can create is M(p) − m(p). To incentivize the agent, the principal needs to
13As we vary the prior, the induced value function is 4p when p < 1/4, 1 when p ∈ [1/4, 3/8] and 8(1−p)5
when p ∈ (3/8, 1). It is concave in p.
14When a∗ is optimal at p = 0, we need to add the term δα(1−p)v(a∗, p) to the objective, which corresponds
to the payoff the principal obtains when the disclosed state is ω0.
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promise a continuation payoff of w(p) in the future and thus needs to create an infor-
mation value of w(p) − m(p). However, to create an information value of w(p) − m(p),
the principal commits to fully disclose the state with some probability, hence forego-
ing the opportunity to incentivize the agent to play a∗ in the future. Therefore, the
highest probability with which the principal can incentivize the agent to play a∗ is
(M(p) − w(p))/(M(p) − m(p)). Yet, as we now explain, the principal can do better by
exploiting the fact that it is easier to incentivize the agent to play a∗ at some beliefs
than at others.
To see how the principal can do better, we study the relaxed version of our problem,
where only the (ex-ante) participation constraint needs to be satisfied. Consider the
following policy. The principal discloses information at the ex-ante stage, i.e., chooses a
splitting (λs, ps)s of p, and recommends the agent to play a∗ at all periods with probability
αs when the realized signal is s. We continue to assume that p ∈ Q1. The policy satisfies
the participation constraint if∑
s
λs [αsu(a
∗, ps) + (1− αs)m(ps)] ≥ m(p).
We can rewrite the participation constraint as:∑
s
λs(1− αs)(m(ps)− u(a∗, ps)) ≥ m(p)− u(a∗, p), (2)
where m(ps)− u(a∗, ps) is the opportunity cost of following the recommendation at belief
ps. The principal aims at maximizing
∑
s λsαsv(a
∗, ps). Clearly, the participation con-
straint binds at a maximum. Moreover, since m is convex, the best for the principal is
to fully disclose all information at the ex-ante stage. It only remains to characterize the
optimal αs. Note that if the principal recommends a∗ with the same probability at all s,
then his payoff is
M(p)−m(p)
M(p)− u(a∗, p)v(a
∗, p),
which is precisely the payoff of the recursive policy.15 To see this, note that if the prin-
cipal recommends a∗ with the same probability α at all s, it is as if the agent plays
a∗ with probability α, regardless of the state, and plays a0 (resp., a1) with probability
(1− α)(1− p) (resp.,, (1− α)p). Since α binds the participation constraint (2), we obtain
the same payoff as the recursive policy.
15When a∗ is optimal at p = 0, we need to add the term (1− p)
(
1− M(p)−m(p)M(p)−u(a∗,p)
)
v(a∗, p).
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However, the principal can do better by exploiting the difference in opportunity costs
at the two extreme beliefs 0 and 1. Writing α1 (resp., α0) for the probability of rec-
ommending a∗ conditional on the posterior being 1 (resp., 0), the principal maximizes
pα1v(a
∗, 1) + (1− p)α0v(a∗, 0) subject to:
pα1(m(1)− u(a∗, 1)) + (1− p)α0(m(0)− u(a∗, 0)) ≤M(p)−m(p).
The right-hand side is the maximal value of information the principal can create, while
the left-hand side is the expected opportunity cost of following the recommendation. As
with the recursive policy, the principal needs to generate the maximal value of informa-
tion; this is the maximal value the principal can use to incentivize the agent. However,
unlike the recursive policy, the principal needs to use the surplus created asymmetri-
cally, as it is easier to incentivize the agent in state ω0 than ω1.
More precisely, the problem is linear in (α0, α1). Therefore, since the slope v(a
∗,0)
v(a∗,1) is
larger than the slope m(0)−u(a
∗,0)
m(1)−u(a∗,1) , the optimal solution is to set α0 as high as possible.
For instance, if M(p) − m(p) ≤ (1 − p)(m(0) − u(a∗, 0)), the best is to set (α0, α1) =
( M(p)−m(p)
(1−p)(m(0)−u(a∗,0)) , 0), resulting in a payoff of
M(p)−m(p)
m(0)− u(a∗, 0) ≥
M(p)−m(p)
M(p)− u(a∗, p) ,
with a strict inequality if the opportunity cost is strictly higher in state ω1.16 This is the
solution to the relaxed constraint.
While our policy also needs to incentivize the agent to follow the recommendation, it
exploits the same asymmetries in opportunity costs as the above policy, which explains
why it outperforms the recursive policy.
To conclude, note that if v(a
∗,0)
v(a∗,1) =
m(0)−u(a∗,0)
m(1)−u(a∗,1) , then the recursive policy solves the relaxed
problem and, therefore, is also optimal.
APPENDIX A. APPENDICES
A.1. Mathematical preliminaries. We collect without proofs some useful results about
concave functions. Let f : [a, b] → R be a concave function and a ≤ x < y < z ≤ b. The
following properties hold:
(a) f(y)−f(x)
y−x ≥ f(z)−f(y)z−y ,
(b) f(y)−f(a)
y−a ≥ f(z)−f(a)z−a ,
16See Appendix A.8 for the full characterization.
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(c) f(b)−f(x)
b−x ≥ f(b)−f(y)b−y .
Note that property (a) implies that
f(y)− f(x)
y − x ≥
f(y + ∆)− f(x+ ∆)
y − x ,
for all ∆ ≥ 0 such that y + ∆ ≤ b. (This is true irrespective of whether x + ∆ T y.) We
will repeatedly use these properties in most of the following proofs.
To prove Lemma 5, we will use the following property: if f : [a, b]→ R satisfies f(x)−f(a)
x−a ≥
f(y)−f(a)
y−a for all a < x ≤ y ≤ b, then f is concave.
A.2. Recursive formulation: Theorem 4 of Ely [2015, p. 44]. We first note that the
operator T is monotone, i.e., for all V ≥ V ′, T (V ) ≥ T (V ′). It also satisfies T (V + c) ≤
T (V ) + δc for all positive constant c ≥ 0, for all V . Hence, it is indeed a contraction by
Blackwell’s theorem.
Ely [2015] proves that the principal’s maximal payoff is maxw∈[m(p0),M(p0)] Vˆ ∗(p0, w), with
Vˆ ∗ the unique fixed point of the contraction Tˆ , with Tˆ differing from T in that the
promised-keeping constraint is in equality; all other constraints are the same. Note
that the operator Tˆ is also monotone.
We now prove that both formulations are equivalent. Clearly, we have that T (V )(p, w) ≥
Tˆ (V )(p, w) for all (p, w) ∈ W, for all V . Let w0 ∈ arg maxw∈[m(p0),M(p0)] Vˆ ∗(p0, w). We have
that
V ∗(p0,m(p0)) ≥ V ∗(p0, w0) = T (V ∗)(p0, w0) ≥ Tˆ (V ∗)(p0, w0) ≥ Tˆ 2(V ∗)(p0, w0) ≥ · · · ≥
≥ lim
n→∞
Tˆ n(V ∗)(p0, w0) = Vˆ ∗(p0, w0),
where the first inequality follows from V ∗ decreasing in w.
Conversely, let (λ∗s, p∗s, w∗s , a∗s)s∈S be a maximizer of T (V ∗)(p0,m(p0)). We have that
M(p0) ≥
∑
s∈S
λ∗sM(p
∗
s) ≥
∑
s∈S
λ∗s[(1− δ)u(a∗s, p∗s) + δw∗s ] := w0 ≥
∑
s∈S
λ∗sm(p
∗
s) ≥ m(p0),
hence (λ∗s, p∗s, w∗s , a∗s)s∈S is a maximizer for T (Vˆ ∗)(p0, w0) and, consequently,
V ∗(p0,m(p0)) = Vˆ ∗(p0, w0) ≤ max
w∈[m(p0),M(p0)]
Vˆ ∗(p0, w).
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A.3. Proposition 2. We break Proposition 2 into several lemmata.
Lemma 1. Let (λs, ps, ws, as)s∈S be a solution to the maximization program T (V ∗)(p, w).
For all s ∈ S such that λs > 0, we have
(1− δ) v (as, ps) + δV ∗ (ps, ws) = V ∗ (ps, (1− δ)u (as, ps) + δws) .
Proof. By contradiction, assume that there exists s′ ∈ S such that λs′ > 0 and
(1− δ) v (as′ , ps′) + δV ∗ (ps′ , ws′) < V ∗ (ps′ , (1− δ)u (as′ , ps′) + δws′) .
Let (λ∗s, p∗s, w∗s , a∗s)s∈S be the policy, which achieves V ∗(ps′ , (1− δ)u(as′ , ps′) + δws′) and con-
sider the new policy
((λs, ps, ws, as)s∈S\{s′}, (λs′λ∗s, p
∗
s, w
∗
s , a
∗
s)s∈S).
By construction, the new policy is feasible. Moreover, we have that∑
s∈S\{s′}
λs[(1− δ)v(as, ps) + δV ∗(ps, ws)] + λs′
∑
s∈S
λ∗s[(1− δ)v(a∗s, p∗s) + δV ∗(p∗s, w∗s)] =∑
s∈S\{s′}
λs[(1− δ)v(as, ps) + δV ∗(ps, ws)] + λs′V ∗(ps′ , (1− δ)u(as′ , ps′) + δws′) >
∑
s∈S
λs[(1− δ)v(as, ps) + δV ∗(ps, ws)],
a contradiction with the optimality of (λs, ps, ws, as)s∈S.
Since the fixed point satisfies V ∗(ps, (1− δ)u(as, ps) + δws) ≥ (1− δ)v(as, ps) + δV ∗(ps, ws),
we have the desired result. 
Lemma 2. Let (λs, ps, ws, as)s∈S be a solution to the maximization program T (V ∗)(p, w).
For all s ∈ S such that λs > 0, V ∗(ps, ws) = 0 if as 6= a∗.
Proof. Let s ∈ S such that λs > 0 and as 6= a∗. We have
(1− δ)v(as, ps) + δV ∗(ps, ws) = δV ∗(ps, ws) ≥ V ∗(ps, (1− δ)u(as, ps) + δws) ≥ V ∗(ps, ws),
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 1 and the second follows from V ∗ decreas-
ing in w and ws ≥ u(as, ps) for
(1− δ)u(as, ps) + δws ≥ m(ps),
to hold. It follows that V ∗(ps, ws) = 0. 
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Lemma 3. Let (λ′s, p′s, w′s, a′s)s∈S′ be a solution to the maximization program T (V ∗)(p, w).
There exists another solution (λs, ps, ws, as)s∈S such that as = a∗ for at most one s ∈ S with
λs > 0.
Proof. Let (λ′s, p′s, w′s, a′s)s∈S′ be a solution to the maximization program T (V ∗)(p, w). Let
S∗ ⊆ S ′ be the set of signals such that as = a∗ and λs > 0. If S∗ is empty, there is nothing
to prove. If S∗ is non-empty, define p∗ as∑
s∈S∗
( λ′s∑
s∈S∗ λ
′
s
)
ps = p
∗,
and
∑
s∈S∗ λ
′
s = λ
∗. From the concavity of V ∗, we have that∑
s∈S∗
λ′s(v(a
∗, p′s)(1− δ) + δV ∗(p′s, w′s)) = λ∗
(
v(a∗, p∗)(1− δ) + δ
∑
s∈S∗
(λ′s
λ∗
)
V (p′s, w
′
s)
)
≤ λ∗
(
v(a∗, p∗)(1− δ) + δV (p∗, w∗)
)
,
where
w∗ =
∑
s∈S∗
( λ′s∑
s∈S∗ λ
′
s
)
w′s.
Notice that w∗ ∈ [m(p∗),M(p∗)] since the convexity of m implies
M(p∗) ≥
∑
s∈S∗
( λ′s∑
s∈S∗ λ
′
s
)
M(p′s) ≥
∑
s∈S∗
( λ′s∑
s∈S∗ λ
′
s
)
ws ≥
∑
s∈S∗
( λ′s∑
s∈S∗ λ
′
s
)
m(p′s) ≥ m(p∗).
It routine to verify that the new contract
((λ′s, p
′
s, w
′
s, a
′
s)s∈S′\S∗ , (λ
∗, p∗, a∗, w∗))
is feasible and, therefore, also optimal. 
Lemma 4. Let (λ′s, p′s, w′s, a′s)s∈S′ be a solution to the maximization program T (V ∗)(p, w).
There exists another solution (λs, ps, ws, as)s∈S such that
(1− δ)u(as, ps) + δws = m(ps),
for all s such that λs > 0 and as = a∗.
Proof. Assume that there exists s∗ such that λ′s∗ > 0, as∗ = a∗ and
(1− δ)u(a′s∗ , p′s∗) + δ(w′s∗ − ε) ≥ m(p′s∗)
for some ε > 0. From Lemma 3, we may assume that there is a single such s∗. Consider
the new tuple (λs, ps, ws, as)s∈S, where ws∗ = w′s∗ − ε, ws˜ = w′s˜ + λs∗λs˜ ε for some s˜ 6= s∗ such
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that λs˜ > 0, ws = w′s for all s ∈ S \ {s∗, s˜}, and (λs, ps, as) = (λ′s, p′s, a′s) for all s. This new
contract is feasible and increases the principal’s payoff. 
A.4. Value functions. This section proves that the policy τq induces a well-defined
value function Vq. As explained in the text, if the value function Vq1 is well-defined,
so are all value functions Vq. We first start with the definition of important subsets of
[0, 1].
A.4.1. Construction of the sets Qk. Let Q0 := [0, 1]. We define inductively the set Qk ⊆
[0, 1], k ≥ 0. We write qk (resp., qk) for inf Qk (resp., supQk). For any k ≥ 0, define the
function Uk : [qk, 1]→ R:
Uk(q) :=
1− q
1− qkm(q
k) +
q − qk
1− qkm(1),
with the convention that Uk ≡ m(1) if qk = 1. Note that U0(q) = M(q) and Uk(q) ≥ m(q)
for all k. We define Qk+1 as follows:
Qk+1 = {q ∈ Qk : (1− δ)u(a∗, q) + δUk(q) ≥ m(q)}.
For a graphical illustration, see Figure 8.
m(·)
Uk(·)
u(a∗, ·)
qk
m(qk)
1
m(1)
(1− δ)u(a∗, ·) + δUk(·)
qk+1 qk+1
FIGURE 8. Construction of the thresholds
Few observations are worth making. First, we have that P ⊆ Qk for all k. Second, we
have a decreasing sequences, i.e., Qk+1 ⊆ Qk for all k. Third, if Qk and P are non-empty,
then they are closed intervals. Fourth, the limit Q∞ = limk→∞Qk =
⋂
kQ
k exists and
includes P . Moreover, if P 6= ∅, then q∞ = p, where p := inf P . If P = ∅, then Q∞ = ∅.
Consequently, there exists k∗ <∞ such that ∅ = Qk∗+1 ⊂ Qk∗ 6= ∅.
The first to the third observations are readily proved, so we concentrate on the proof of
the fourth observation. The limit exists as we have a decreasing sequence of sets.
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We prove that if P = ∅, then Q∞ = ∅. We first argue that if Qk = Qk−1 6= ∅ for some k ≥ 0,
hence Qk′ = Qk−1 for all k′ ≥ k, then P 6= ∅. From the convexity and continuity of m
and the linearity of u, Qk−1 is the closed interval [qk−1, qk−1], with both boundary points
solution to
(1− δ)u(a∗, q) + δUk−2(q) = m(q).
Therefore, if (qk, qk) = (qk−1, qk−1), we have that:
m(qk−1) = (1− δ)u(a∗, qk−1) + δm(qk−1),
m(qk−1) = (1− δ)u(a∗, qk−1) + δ
[1− qk−1
1− qk−1m(q
k−1) +
qk−1 − qk−1
1− qk−1 m(1)
]
,
≤ (1− δ)u(a∗, qk−1) + δm(qk−1).
This implies that u(a∗, qk−1) = m(qk−1) and u(a∗, qk−1) = m(qk−1) and, therefore, ∅ 6=
Qk−1 ⊆ P , a contradiction. Therefore, we must have an infinite sequence of strictly
decreasing non-empty closed intervals. Let ε := minp∈P m(p)−u(a∗, p). Since P = ∅, ε > 0
and for all p ∈ Q∞, for all k,
m(p) ≤ (1− δ)u(a∗, p) + δUk(p),
≤ (1− δ)(m(p)− ε) + δUk(p).
It follows that m(qk) ≥ m(q∞) + ε(1− δ)/δ for all k and, therefore, m(q∞) ≥ m(q∞) + ε(1−
δ)/δ, a contradiction.
We now prove that if P 6= ∅, then q∞ = p. From above, we have that if Qk = Qk−1 6= ∅ for
some k ≥ 0, hence Qk′ = Qk−1 for all k′ ≥ k, then P = Qk since P ⊆ Qk. If we have an
infinite sequence of strictly decreasing sets, for all q ∈ Q∞,
(1− δ)u(a∗, q) + δ
[ 1− q
1− q∞m(q
∞) +
q − q∞
1− q∞m(1)
]
≥ m(q).
Taking the limit q ↓ q∞, we obtain that u(a∗, q∞) = m(q∞), i.e., q∞ ∈ P . Hence, q∞ = p.
A.4.2. Value functions. We first argue that Vq1 is well-defined at all (p, w) ∈ W \W2q1.
To start with, Vq1(1,m(1)) = 0 since a∗ is not optimal at p = 1. Similarly, Vq1(0,m(0)) = 0
if a∗ is not optimal at p = 0, while Vq1(0,m(0) = v(a∗, 0) if a∗ is optimal at p = 0. Also,
Vq1(q
1,m(q1)) = (1 − δ)v(a∗, q1) if q1 > 0; while Vq1(0,m(0)) = v(a∗, 0) if q1 = 0, since a∗ is
then optimal at p = 0.
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With the function Vq1 defined at these three points, it is then defined at all points (p, w)
inW1
q1
∪W4
q1
. In particular, it is easy to show that
Vq1(q
1, w) =
M(q1)− w
M(q1)−m(q1)(1− δ)v(a
∗, q1) =
M(q1)− w
M(q1)− u(a∗, q1)v(a
∗, q1),
for all w ∈ [m(q1),M(q1)].
At all points (p, w) ∈ W3
q2
,
Vq1(p, w) =
1− p
1− q1Vq1(q
1,m(q1)).
Therefore, Vq1 is well-defined at all (p, w) ∈ W \W2q1.
At all points (p, w) ∈ W2
q1
, Vq1(p, w) is defined via the recursive equation:
Vq1(p, w) = λ(p, w)[(1−δ)v(a∗, ϕ(p, w))+δVq1(ϕ(p, w),w(ϕ(p, w))] = λ(p, w)Vq1(ϕ(p, w),m(ϕ(p, w))).
Since Vq1(p, w) = λ(p, w)Vq1(ϕ(p, w),m(ϕ(p, w)), the value function is well-defined at all
(p, w) if it is well-defined at all (p,m(p)), which we now prove.
By construction of the sets Qk, observe that if p ∈ Qk \Qk+1, then w(p) ∈ (Uk(p), Uk+1(p)]
and, therefore, ϕ(p,w(p)) ∈ [qk−1, qk) ⊂ Qk−1 \ Qk. Moreover, ϕ(qk,w(qk)) = qk. We now
use these observations to prove that Vq1 is well-defined.
For all p ∈ Q1 \Q2, we have that w(p) ∈ Q1 \Q0, so that (p,w(p)) ∈ W4
q1
. Since
Vq1(p,m(p)) = (1− δ)v(a∗, p) + δVq1(p,w(p)),
Vq1(p,m(p)) is well-defined for all p ∈ Q1 \ Q2. By induction, assume that it is well-
defined for all p ∈ ⋃`<kQ` \ Q`+1. We argue that it is well-defined for all p ∈ Qk \ Qk+1.
Fix any p ∈ Qk \Qk+1. From our initial observation, ϕ(p,w(p)) ∈ [qk−1, qk) and, therefore,
Vq1(p,m(p)) is well-defined since
Vq1(p,m(p)) = (1− δ)v(a∗, p) + δVq1(p,w(p))
= (1− δ)v(a∗, p) + λ(p,w(p))Vq1(ϕ(p,w(p)),m(ϕ(p,w(p))))︸ ︷︷ ︸
defined by the induction step
.
Therefore, Vq1(p,m(p)) is well-defined for all p ∈
⋃
`Q
` \ Q`+1 = Q1 \ Q∞. It remains to
argue that it is well-defined for all p ∈ Q∞.
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From the definition of Q∞, we have that w(p) ≤ 1−p
1−q∞m(q
∞) +
p−p
1−pm(1) and, therefore,
ϕ(p,w(p)) ∈ Q∞. Consequently, the restriction of Vq1(p,m(p)) to Q∞ is defined via the
contraction:
Vq1(p,m(p)) = (1− δ)v(a∗, p) + δλ(p,w(p))Vq1(ϕ(p,w(p)),m(ϕ(p,w(p))).
The unique solution to this fixed point problem is given by:
Vq1(p,m(p)) = v(a
∗, p)− m(p)− u(a
∗, p)
m(1)− u(a∗, 1)v(a
∗, 1),
for all p ∈ Q∞. To see this, with a slight abuse of notation, write (λ, ϕ) for (λ(p, w), ϕ(p,w(p))),
and note that:
(1− δ)v(a∗, p) + δλ
[
v(a∗, ϕ)− m(ϕ)− u(a
∗, ϕ)
m(1)− u(a∗, 1) v(a
∗, 1)
]
=
(1− δ)v(a∗, p) + δ [v(a∗, p)− (1− λ)v(a∗, 1)]
− m(p)− (1− λ)m(1)− u(a
∗, p)(1− δ)
m(1)− u(a∗, 1) v(a
∗, 1) + δ
u(a∗, p)− (1− λ)u(a∗, 1)
m(1)− u(a∗, 1) v(a
∗, 1) =
v(a∗, p)− m(p)− u(a
∗, p)
m(1)− u(a∗, 1)v(a
∗, 1),
where we use the identities λϕ + (1− λ)1 = p, λm(ϕ) + (1− λ)m(1) = w(p), and δw(p) =
m(p)− (1− δ)u(a∗, p).
This completes the proof that Vq1 is well-defined. Note that Vq1 and, therefore, all value
functions Vq, are continuous functions.
A.4.3. Value functions: another representation. We now present another construction of
Vq. For any q ∈ [q1, q1], define the function mq : [0, 1]→ R as
(
1− p
q1
)
m(0) + p
q1
m(q1) if p ∈ [0, q1],
m(p) if p ∈ (q1, q],
1−p
1−qm(q) +
p−q
1−qm(1) if p ∈ (q, 1].
Note that mq is convex, mq(p) ≥ m(p) for all p ∈ [0, 1], mq(0) = m(0) and mq(1) = m(1).
For a graphical illustration, see Figure 9.
It is straightforward to check that we have the following formula:
Vq(p, w) = λ(p, w)Vq(ϕ(p, w),mq(ϕ(p, w)),
where the functions λ and ϕ are defined as in the main text, but with mq, instead.
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m(·)
M(·)
q1 1
m(1)
q1q
mq(·)
FIGURE 9. The function mq
A.5. Theorem 2. To prove Theorem 2, we prove the following proposition and invoke
Theorem 1.
Proposition 3. Let Vq∗ be the value function induced by the policy τ ∗, with
q∗ = sup
{
p ∈ Q1 : Vq1(p,m(p)) ≥ Vq1(p, w) for all w
}
.
Then, Vq∗ is concave in (p, w), decreasing in w, and satisfies:
Vq∗(p,m(p) ≥ (1− δ)v(a∗, p) + δVq∗(p∗,w(p)),
for all p ∈ Q1.
We start with two preliminary observations.
OBSERVATION A. We have the following identity:
Vq(p, w) =
1− p
1− p′Vq
(
p′,
1− p′
1− p w +
p′ − p
1− p mq(1)
)
.
The proof is as follows. Let w′ = 1−p
′
1−p w +
p′−p
1−pmq(1). Assume that w
′ > mq(p′). Since
λ(p′, w′)
 ϕ(p′, w′)
mq(ϕ(p
′, w′))
+ (1− λ(p′, w′))
 1
mq
 =
p′
w′
 ,
we have
1− p
1− p′λ(p
′, w′)
 ϕ(p′, w′)
mq(ϕ(p
′, w′))
+ (1− 1− p
1− p′λ(p
′, w′)
) 1
mq(1)
 =
p
w
 .
Therefore, λ(p, w) = 1−p
1−p′λ(p
′, w′) and ϕ(p′, w′) = ϕ(p, w) since the solution is unique when
w′ > mq(p′).
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Finally, if mq(p′) = 1−p
′
1−pmq(p) +
p′−p
1−pmq(1), the result follows from continuity as:
Vq(p,mq(p)) = lim
w→mq(p)
Vq(p, w),
= lim
w→mq(p)
1− p
1− p′Vq
(
p′,
1− p′
1− p w +
p′ − p
1− p mq(1)
)
,
=
1− p
1− p′Vq
(
p′,
1− p′
1− p mq(p) +
p′ − p
1− p mq(1)
)
,
=
1− p
1− p′Vq (p
′,mq(p′)) .
Note that this implies that
Vq(p,w(p) + c) = λ(p,w(p))Vq
(
ϕ(p,w(p)),mq∗(ϕ(p,w(p))) +
c
λ(p,w(p))
)
,
where c is a positive constant.
OBSERVATION B. The value function Vq1(p, ·) : [mq1(p),M(p)] → R is concave in w, for
each p. See Lemma 5 in section A.6.
A.5.1. Proposition 3(a). We prove that Vq∗ decreasing in w. To start with, fix p ∈ [0, 1]
and (w,w′) ∈ [mq∗(p),M(p)]× [mq∗(p),M(p)], with w′ > w.
First, assume that p ≤ q∗. If w = mq∗(p), then Vq∗(p, w′) ≤ Vq∗(p, w) by construction of q∗.
If w > mq∗(p), we have that
Vq∗(p, w
′)− Vq∗(p, w)
w′ − w =
Vq1(p, w
′)− Vq1(p, w)
w′ − w
≤ Vq1(p, w)− Vq1(p,mq∗(p))
w −mq∗(p)
=
Vq∗(p, w)− Vq∗(p,mq∗(p))
w −mq∗(p) ≤ 0,
where the inequality follows from the concavity of Vq1 with respect to w, for all w ≥
mq1(p). (Recall that mq∗(p) = mq1(p) for all p ≤ q∗.)
Second, assume that p > q∗. We show in great details how to make use of Observation A
to deduce the result. We repeatedly use similar computations later on. We have
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Vq∗(p, w
′) = λ(p, w′)Vq∗(ϕ(p, w′),mq∗(ϕ(p, w′)))
= λ(p, w′)
1− ϕ(p, w′)
1− ϕ(p, w) Vq∗
(
ϕ(p, w),
1− ϕ(p, w)
1− ϕ(p, w′)mq∗(ϕ(p, w
′)) +
(
1− 1− ϕ(p, w)
1− ϕ(p, w′)
)
mq∗(1)
)
= λ(p, w)Vq∗
(
ϕ(p, w),
λ(p, w′)
λ(p, w)
mq∗(ϕ(p, w
′)) +
(
1− λ(p, w
′)
λ(p, w)
)
mq∗(1)
)
= λ(p, w)Vq∗
(
ϕ(p, w),mq∗(ϕ(p, w)) +
w′ − w
λ(p, w)
)
,
where the first line follows from the construction of Vq∗, the second line from Observation
A, the third line from the definition of the functions λ and ϕ and the last line from the
following computations:
λ(p, w′)
λ(p, w)
mq∗(ϕ(p, w
′)) +
(
1− λ(p, w
′)
λ(p, w)
)
mq∗(1) =
1
λ(p, w)
w′ +
(
1− 1
λ(p, w)
)
mq∗(1)
=
1
λ(p, w)
w′ +
(
1− 1
λ(p, w)
)[
w − λ(p, w)mq∗(ϕ(p, w))
1− λ(p, w)
]
= mq∗(ϕ(p, w)) +
w′ − w
λ(p, w)
.
Thus, we are able to express Vq∗(p, w′) as λ(p, w)Vq∗(ϕ(p, w), w˜), with w˜ the above ex-
pression. Moreover, ϕ(p, w) ≤ q∗ as w ≥ mq∗(p). We can use the (already established)
concavity of Vq∗ in w for each p ≤ q∗ to deduce the desired result. More precisely, we have
that:
Vq∗(p, w
′)− Vq∗(p, w)
w′ − w =
λ(p, w)
(
Vq∗
(
ϕ(p, w),mq∗(ϕ(p, w)) +
w′−w
λ(p,w)
)
− Vq∗ (ϕ(p, w),mq∗(ϕ(p, w)))
)
w′ − w
≤ 0,
where the inequality follows from the concavity of Vq∗ in w at all p ≤ q∗.
Lastly, since Vq∗(p, w) = Vq∗(p,mq∗(p)) for all w ∈ [m(p),mq∗(p)], the result immediately
follows for all (w,w′), with w ∈ [m(p),mq∗(p)].
A.5.2. Proposition 3(b). We prove the concavity of Vq∗ with respect to both arguments
(p, w).
Let (p, w) ∈ W, (p′, w′) ∈ W and α ∈ [0, 1]. Write (pα, wα) for
α
p
w
+ (1− α)
p′
w′
 .
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Without loss of generality, assume that p ≤ p′. We have that:
αVq∗(p, w) + (1− α)Vq∗(p′, w′)
= α
1− p
1− p′Vq∗
(
p′,
1− p′
1− p w +
p′ − p
1− p mq∗(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥mq∗ (p′)
)
+ (1− α)Vq∗(p′, w′)
≤
(
α
1− p
1− p′ + (1− α)
)
Vq∗
p′, α 1−p1−p′
(
1−p′
1−p w +
p′−p
1−pmq∗(1)
)
+ (1− α)w′
α 1−p
1−p′ + (1− α)

=
1− pα
1− p′ Vq∗
(
p′,
1− p′
1− pαwα +
p′ − pα
1− pα mq
∗(1)
)
= Vq∗(pα, wα),
where the inequality follows from the concavity of Vq1 with respect to w for each p and
the property that Vq∗(p, w) = Vq1(p, w) for all (p, w) such that w ≥ mq∗(p). Notice that we
use twice Observation A.
Finally, for all (p, w) ∈ W, for all (p′, w′) ∈ W and for all α, we have that:
αVq∗(p, w) + (1− α)Vq∗(p′, w′) = αVq∗(p,max(w,mq∗(p))) + (1− α)Vq∗(p′,max(w′,mq∗(p′)))
≤ Vq∗(pα, αmax(w,mq∗(p)) + (1− α) max(w,mq∗(p′)))
≤ Vq∗(pα, wα),
since αmax(w,mq∗(p)) + (1 − α) max(w,mq∗(p′)) ≥ wα and the fact that Vq∗ is decreasing
in w for all p. This completes the proof of concavity.
A.5.3. Proposition 3 (c). We prove that Vq∗(p,m(p)) ≥ (1− δ)v(a∗, p) + δVq∗(p,w(p)) for all
p ∈ Q1.
The statement is true for all p ≤ q∗ by definition. For p > q∗, we have that
1− p
1− q∗mq∗(q
∗) +
p− q∗
1− q∗mq∗(1)−w(p) =
1− p
1− q∗m(q
∗) +
p− q∗
1− q∗m(1)−w(p)
≥ m(p)−w(p)
≥ 0,
hence Vq∗(p,w(p)) = Vq1(p,w(p)). Since Vq1(p,m(p)) = (1 − δ)v(a∗, p) + δVq1(p,w(p)) for
all p ∈ Q1 and Vq∗(p,m(p)) = Vq∗(p,mq∗(p)) = Vq1(p,mq∗(p)), it is enough to prove that
Vq1(p,mq∗(p)) ≥ Vq1(p,m(p)).
Clearly, there is nothing prove if mq∗(p) = m(p) for all p ∈ Q1, i.e., if q∗ = q1 (remember
that mq1(p) = m(p) for all p ∈ Q1).
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So, assume that mq∗(p) > m(p) for some p ∈ (q∗, q1), hence mq∗(p) > m(p) for all p ∈
(q∗, q1). We now argue that if Vq1(p, w) > Vq1(p,m(p)) for some w ≥ mq∗(p), then
Vq1(p
′,m(p′)) <
1− p′
1− p Vq1(p, w),
for all p′ > p. To see this, observe that w > m(p) and, accordingly,
1− p′
1− p w +
p′ − p
1− p m(1)−m(p
′) > 0,
since m is convex. Hence,
0 <
Vq1(p, w)− Vq1(p,m(p))
w −m(p)
=
1−p
1−p′
[
Vq1
(
p′, 1−p
′
1−p w +
p′−p
1−pm(1)
)
− Vq1
(
p′, 1−p
′
1−pm(p) +
p′−p
1−pm(1)
)]
w −m(p)
≤
Vq1
(
p′, 1−p
′
1−p w +
p′−p
1−pm(1)
)
− Vq1 (p′,m(p′))
1−p′
1−p w +
p′−p
1−pm(1)−m(p′)
,
where the equality follows Observation A and the inequality from the concavity of Vq1 in
w for each p. Since
Vq1(p, w) =
1− p
1− p′Vq1
(
p′,
1− p′
1− p w +
p′ − p
1− p m(1)
)
,
we have the desired result.
Finally, from the definition of q∗, for all n > 0, there exist pn ∈ (q∗,min(q∗ + 1n , q1)] and
wn ≥ m(pn) such that Vq1(pn,m(pn)) < Vq1(pn, wn). From the concavity of Vq1 in w for all p,
Vq1(pn,m(pn)) < Vq1(pn,mq∗(pn)) for all n.
From the above argument, for all p, for all n sufficiently large, i.e., such that pn < p, we
have that
Vq1(p,m(p)) <
1− p
1− pnVq1(pn,mq
∗(pn)).
Taking the limit as n→∞, we obtain that
Vq1(p,m(p)) <
1− p
1− q∗Vq1(q
∗,mq∗(q∗)) = Vq1(p,mq∗(p)),
which completes the proof.
A.6. Concavity of Vq1 with respect to w for each p.
Lemma 5. The value function Vq1(p, ·) : [mq1(p),M(p)]→ R is concave in w, for each p.
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This section proves that Vq1 is concave in w for each p. To do so, we prove that
Vq1(p,mq1(p) + η(mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)))− Vq1(p,mq1(p))
η
≥
Vq1(p,mq1(p) + η
′(mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)))− Vq1(p,mq1(p))
η′
,
for all (η, η′) such that η′ ≥ η. (See the observations on concave functions.) We start with
some preliminary results.
A.6.1. Preliminary Results. We study how the function ϕ(p,w(p)) varies with p.
Lemma 6. There exists a non-empty interval [q, q] such that:
(1) For any p′ < p ≤ q or p′ > p ≥ q¯, ϕ(p,w(p)) ≥ ϕ(p′,w(p′)),
(2) The ratio m(1)−m(ϕ(p,w(p))
1−ϕ(p,w(p)) is constant for all p ∈ [q, q].
Proof of Lemma 6. Observe that
m(1)−w(p)
1− p =
m(1)−m(ϕ(p,w(p))
1− ϕ(p,w(p)) .
Therefore, the convexity of m implies that if m(1)−w(p)
1−p <
m(1)−w(p′)
1−p′ , then ϕ(p,w(p)) <
ϕ(p′,w(p′)).
Consider the function h : [0, 1] → R, defined by h(p) = m(1)−w(p)
1−p . We argue that h is
quasi-concave. For all (p, p′) and α ∈ [0, 1], we have that
m(1)−w(αp+ (1− α)p′)
α(1− p) + (1− α)(1− p′) ≥
α(m(1)−w(p)) + (1− α)(m(1)−w(p′))
α(1− p) + (1− α)(1− p′)
=
α(1− p)
α(1− p) + (1− α)(1− p′)
m(1)−w(p)
1− p +
(1− α)(1− p′)
α(1− p) + (1− α)(1− p′)
m(1)−w(p′)
1− p′
≥ min
(
m(1)−w(p)
1− p ,
m(1)−w(p′)
1− p′
)
,
where the first inequality follows form the convexity of w. (Note that the inequality is
strict if w(αp+ (1− α)p′) < αw(p) + (1− α)w(p′).)
It follows that if h(p′) ≥ h(p), then it is also true for all p′′ ∈ (p, p′). Since h is quasi-
concave and continuous, the set of maxima is a non-empty convex set [q, q], and the
function is increasing for all p < q and decreasing for all p > q. (Note that m(1)−w(1) =
(1−δ)(u(a∗,1)−m(1))
δ
< 0, hence the function is equal to −∞ at p = 1.) 
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We can make few additional observations about the interval [q, q]. Let k∗ := sup{k : Qk 6=
∅}. Since ϕ(qk,w(qk)) = qk, the function h is decreasing for all p ≥ qk∗. Similarly, since
ϕ(qk,w(qk)) = qk−1, the function h is increasing for all p ≤ qk∗. Therefore, [q, q] ⊂ Qk∗.
If P 6= ∅, so that k∗ = ∞, then for all p ∈ P , the function h is increasing by convexity of
m since w(p) = m(p). (This is clearly true since ϕ(p,m(p)) = p in that region.) Therefore,
p ≤ q if P 6= ∅.
Finally, let p˜ := inf{p : m(p) = u(a1, p)}. We have that q < p˜. To see this, observe that for
all p ≥ p˜,
m(1)−w(p)
1− p =
(1− δ)(
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
u(a∗, 1)− u(a1, 1))
1− p +
(u(a1, 0)− u(a1, 1))− (1− δ)(u(a∗, 0)− u(a∗, 1))
δ
,
hence it is decreasing in p. (If there are multiple optimal actions at p = 1, the argument
applies to all of them and, therefore, to the one that induces the smallest p˜.)
The second preliminary result is technical. For any p ∈ (0, 1) and any η ∈
[
0,
M(p)−mq1 (p)
mq1 (1)−u(a∗,1)
]
,
define w(p; η) as
mq1(p) + η
[
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
]
,
and write (λη, ϕη) for (λ(p, w(p; η)), ϕ(p, w(p; η))). To ease notation, we do not explicitly
write the dependence of (λη, ϕη) on p. We have the following:
Lemma 7. ϕη, λη, and 1−ληη are all decreasing in η.
The proof follows directly from the definition of (λη, ϕη) and omitted.
Finally, we conclude with the following implication of Observation A, which wel use
throughout. For all (p, w, w′) with w ≤ w′, we have that:
Vq1(p, w)− Vq1(p, w′) = λ(p, w)
[
Vq1(ϕ(p, w),mq1(p, w))− Vq1
(
ϕ(p, w),mq1(p, w) +
w′ − w
λ(p, w)
)]
.
A.6.2. Proof of Lemma 5. We now prove that the gradient G(p; η) := Vq1 (p,mq1 (p))−Vq1 (p,w(p;η))
η
is increasing in η ∈
[
0,
M(p)−mq1 (p)
mq1 (1)−u(a∗,1)
]
, for all p. We prove it on three separate intervals I1,
I2 and I3. If P = ∅, the three intervals are [0, q], (q, q] and (q, 1], respectively. If P 6= ∅,
the three intervals are [0, p], (p, q∞] and (q∞, 1], respectively.
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A.6.3. For all p ∈ I1, G(p; η) is increasing in η. We limit attention to the case P 6= ∅. (The
case P = ∅ is identical.) The proof is by induction. First, consider the interval [0, q1].
Remember that at q1, we have a closed-form solution for Vq1(q1, w) for all wgiven by
Vq1(q
1, w) =
M(q1)− w
M(q)− u(a∗, q1)v(a
∗, q1).
Therefore,
Vq1(q
1,mq1(q
1))− Vq1(q1, w(q1; η))
η
=
1
η
[
M(q1)−mq1(q1)
M(q1)− u(a∗, q1)v(a
∗, q1)− M(q
1)− w(q1; η)
M(q1)− u(a∗, q1)v(a
∗, q1)
]
=
v(a∗, q1)
M(q1)− u(a∗, q1)
[mq1(q
1) + η(m(1)− u(a∗, 1))]−mq1(q1)
η
=
q1v(a∗, 1) + (1− q1)v(a∗, 1)
q1[mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)]− (1− q1)[mq1(0)− u(a∗, 0)]
w(q1; η)−mq1(q1)
η
= v(a∗, 1)
q1 + (1− q1)v(a∗,0)
v(a∗,1)
q1 + (1− q1)mq1 (0)−u(a∗,0)
mq1 (1)−u(a∗,1)
≥ v(a∗, q1).
We now consider any p ∈ [0, q1). From Observation A, we have that:
Vq1(p,mq1(p)) =
1− p
1− q1Vq1
(
q1,
1− q1
1− p mq1(p) +
(
1− 1− q
1
1− p
)
mq1(1)
)
Vq1(p, w(p; η)) =
1− p
1− q1Vq1
(
q1,
1− q1
1− p mq1(p) +
(
1− 1− q
1
1− p
)
mq1(1) +
1− q1
1− p η
[
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
])
It follows that
Vq1(p,mq1(p))− Vq1(p, w(p; η))
η
=
1− p
1− q1
Vq1
(
q1,
1−q1
1−p mq1(p) +
(
1− 1−q
1
1−p
)
mq1(1)
)
− Vq1
(
q1,
1−q1
1−p mq1(p) +
(
1− 1−q
1
1−p
)
mq1(1) +
1−q1
1−p η
[
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
])
η
> 1− p
1− q1
1− q1
1− p v(a
∗, 1) = v(a∗, 1).
Therefore, G(p; η) ≥ v(a∗, 1) for all η, for all p ∈ [0, q1]. Moreover, the gradient G(p; η) is
independent of η for all p ∈ [0, q1], hence (weakly) increasing.
By induction, assume that G(p; η) ≥ v(a∗, 1) for all p ∈ [0, qk] and increasing in η, we want
to prove that both properties also hold for all p ∈ (qk, qk+1].
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We rewrite Vq1(p, w(p; η)) as follows:
Vq1(p, w(p; η)) = ληVq1(ϕη,mq1(ϕη)) = λη
[
(1− δ)v(a∗, ϕη) + δVq1(ϕη,w(ϕη))
]
= (1− δ)ληv(a∗, ϕη) + δληVq1(ϕη,w(ϕη))
= (1− δ)ληv(a∗, ϕη) + δVq1
(
p, ληw(ϕη) + [1− λη]mq1(1)
)
= (1− δ)ληv(a∗, ϕη) + δVq1
(
p,w(p) +
η − (1− δ)(1− λη)
δ
[mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)]
)
.
The second to last equality follows from Observation A, while the last equality follows
from:
ληw(ϕη) + [1− λη]mq1(1) = λη
−(1− δ)u(a∗, ϕη) +mq1(ϕη)
δ
+ [1− λη]mq1(1)
=
−(1− δ)
δ
ληu(a
∗, ϕη) +
1
δ
ληmq1(ϕη) + [1− λη]mq1(1)
=
−(1− δ)
δ
[u(a∗, p)− (1− λη)u(a∗, 1)] + 1
δ
[
w(p; η)− (1− λη)mq1(1)
]
+ [1− λη]mq1(1)
=
−(1− δ)
δ
[u(a∗, p)− (1− λη)u(a∗, 1)] + 1
δ
[
mq1(p) + η(mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1))− (1− λη)mq1(1)
]
+ [1− λη]mq1(1)
=
[−(1− δ)
δ
u(a∗, p) +
1
δ
mq1(p)
]
+
η − (1− δ)(1− λη)
δ
[m(1)− u(a∗, 1)].
For future reference, recall that
ληw(ϕη) + (1− λη)mq1(1) = λη
[
λ(ϕη,w(ϕη))mq1(ϕ(ϕη,w(ϕη))) + (1− λ(ϕη,w(ϕη))mq1(1)
]
+(1− λη)mq1(1),
so that
ϕ
(
p,w(p) +
η − (1− δ)(1− λη)
δ
[mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)]
)
= ϕ(ϕη,w(ϕη)),
and
λ
(
p,w(p) +
η − (1− δ)(1− λη)
δ
[mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)]
)
= ληλ(ϕη,w(ϕη)).
Since ϕη is decreasing in η, we have that ϕη′ ≤ ϕη when η′ > η and, therefore, we have
that ϕ(ϕη,w(ϕη)) ≤ ϕ(ϕη′ ,w(ϕη′)) since ϕη′ ≤ ϕη ≤ p ≤ q. Similarly, since ϕη < p ≤ q, we
have that ϕ(ϕη,w(ϕη)) ≤ ϕ(p,w(p)) and, therefore, η−(1−δ)(1−λη)δ > 0.
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We now return to the computation of the gradient. We have:
=
[
(1− δ)v(a∗, p) + δVq1(p,w(p))
]− [(1− δ)ληv(a∗, ϕη) + δVq1 (p,w(p) + η−(1−δ)(1−λη)δ [m(1)− u(a∗, 1)])]
η
=
(1− δ)
η
[v(a∗, p)− ληv(a∗, ϕη)] + δ
η
[
Vq1(p,w(p))− Vq1
(
p,w(p) +
η − (1− δ)(1− λη)
δ
[m(1)− u(a∗, 1)]
)]
=
(1− δ)
η
(1− λη)v(a∗, 1) + δ
η
[
Vq1(p,w(p))− Vq1
(
p,w(p) +
η − (1− δ)(1− λη)
δ
[m(1)− u(a∗, 1)]
)]
.
(3)
We further develop the above expression. To ease notation, we write (ϕ(p), λ(p)) for
(ϕ(p,w(p)), λ(p,w(p))). Note that ϕ(p) ∈ (qk−1, qk], since p ∈ (qk, qk+1]. As
η − (1− δ)(1− λη)
δ
> 0,
we have
=
(1− δ)
η
(1− λη)v(a∗, 1) + δ
η
[
Vq1(p,w(p))− Vq1
(
p,w(p) +
η − (1− δ)(1− λη)
δ
[m(1)− u(a∗, 1)]
)]
=
(1− δ)
η
(1− λη)v(a∗, 1) + δ
η
η − (1− δ)(1− λη)
δ
Vq1(p,w(p))− Vq1
(
p,w(p) +
η−(1−δ)(1−λη)
δ
[m(1)− u(a∗, 1)]
)
η−(1−δ)(1−λη)
δ
=
(1− δ)
η
(1− λη)v(a∗, 1) +
[
1− (1− δ) (1− λη)
η
] λ(p) [Vq1(ϕ(p),mq1(ϕ(p)))− Vq1 (ϕ(p),mq1(ϕ(p)) + η−(1−δ)(1−λη)δλ(p) [m(1)− u(a∗, 1)])]
η−(1−δ)(1−λη)
δ
=
(1− δ)
η
(1− λη)v(a∗, 1) +
[
1− (1− δ) (1− λη)
η
] Vq1(ϕ(p),mq1(ϕ(p)))− Vq1 (ϕ(p),mq1(ϕ(p)) + η−(1−δ)(1−λη)δλ(p) [m(1)− u(a∗, 1)])
η−(1−δ)(1−λη)
δλ(p)
> (1− δ)
η
(1− λη)v(a∗, 1) +
[
1− (1− δ) (1− λη)
η
]
v(a∗, 1) = v(a∗, 1),
where we use Observation A and the induction step.
We now show that the gradient is increasing in η. To start with, note that η−(1−δ)(1−λη)
δ
is
increasing in η since 1−λη
η
is decreasing in η (see Lemma 7). For any η > η′, we have the
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following
Vq1(p,w(p))− Vq1
(
p,w(p) + η−(1−δ)(1−λη)
δ
[
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
])
η−(1−δ)(1−λη)
δ
=
λ(p)Vq1(ϕ(p),mq1(ϕ(p)))− λ(p)Vq1
(
ϕ(p),mq1(ϕ(p)) +
η−(1−δ)(1−λη)
δλ(p)
[
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
])
η−(1−δ)(1−λ)
δ
=
Vq1(ϕ(p),mq1(ϕ(p)))− Vq1
(
ϕ(p),mq1(ϕ(p)) +
η−(1−δ)(1−λη)
δλ(p)
[
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
])
η−(1−δ)(1−λ)
δλ(p)
>
Vq1(ϕ(p),mq1(ϕ(p)))− Vq1
(
ϕ(p),mq1(ϕ(p)) +
η′−(1−δ)(1−λη′ )
δλ(p)
[
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
])
η′−(1−δ)(1−λη′ )
δλ(p)
=
Vq1(p,w(p))− Vq1
(
p,w(p) +
η′−(1−δ)(1−λη′ )
δ
[
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
])
η′−(1−δ)(1−λη′ )
δ
,
where the inequality follows from the fact that ϕ(p) ∈ (qk−1, qk] and, therefore, the gra-
dient G(ϕ(p); η) being increasing in η by the induction hypothesis.
Finally, we have that
1
η
[
Vq1(p,mq1(p))− Vq1(p, w(p; η))
]
=
(1− δ) (1− λη)
η
v(a∗, 1) +
[
1− (1− δ) (1− λη)
η
] Vq1(p,w(p))− Vq1 (p,w(p) + η−(1−δ)(1−λη)δ [m(1)− u(a∗, 1)])
η−(1−δ)(1−λη)
δ
> (1− δ) (1− λη)
η
v(a∗, 1) +
[
1− (1− δ) (1− λη)
η
] Vq1(p,w(p))− Vq1 (p,w(p) + η′−(1−δ)(1−λη′ )δ [mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)])
η′−(1−δ)(1−λη′ )
δ
=
(1− δ) (1− λη′)
η′
v(a∗, 1) +
[
1− (1− δ) (1− λη′)
η′
] Vq1(p,w(p))− Vq1 (p,w(p) + η′−(1−δ)(1−λη′ )δ [mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)])
η′−(1−δ)(1−λη′ )
δ
+
[
(1− δ) (1− λη′)
η′
− (1− δ) (1− λη)
η
]Vq1(p,w(p))− Vq1
(
p,w(p) +
η′−(1−δ)(1−λη′ )
δ
[
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
])
η′−(1−δ)(1−λη′ )
δ
− v(a∗, 1)

> 1
η′
[
Vq1(p,mq1(p))− Vq1(p, w(p; η′))
]
+
[
(1− δ) (1− λη′)
η′
− (1− δ) (1− λη)
η
]Vq1(ϕ(p),mq1(ϕ(p)))− Vq1
(
ϕ(p),mq1(ϕ(p)) +
η′−(1−δ)(1−λη′ )
δλ(p)
[
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
])
η′−(1−δ)(1−λη′ )
δλ(p)
− v(a∗, 1)

> 1
η′
[
Vq1(p,mq1(p))− Vq1(p, w(p; η′))
]
.
The last inequality follows from the fact that the gradient in the second bracket is
weakly larger than v(a∗, 1) by the induction hypothesis and the fact that 1−λη
η
<
1−λη′
η′
(Lemma 7).
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Since limk→∞ qk = p when P 6= ∅, this completes the proof that the gradient is greater
than v(a∗, 1) for all p ∈ [0, p].
A.6.4. For all p ∈ I2, G(p; η) is increasing in η. We first treat the case P 6= ∅. Recall that
for all p ∈ (p, q∞], we have an explicit definition of the value function Vq1(p,mq1(p)) as:
v(a∗, p)− mq1(p)− u(a
∗, p)
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
v(a∗, 1).
Define η¯(p) as the solution to ϕη¯(p) = ϕ(p, w(p; η¯(p))) = p. Note that for any p ∈ (p, q∞], for
any η ≤ η¯, ϕη ∈ [p, q∞]. Therefore,
Vq1(p, w(p; η)) = ληVq1(ϕη,mq1(ϕη)) = λη
[
v(a∗, ϕη)−
mq1(ϕη)− u(a∗, ϕη)
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
v(a∗, 1)
]
= v(a∗, p)− w(p; η)− u(a
∗, p)
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
v(a∗, 1).
It follows that the gradient is equal to v(a∗, 1) for all p ∈ (p, p∗], for all η ≤ η¯.
Consider now η > η¯. We rewrite the gradient G(p; η) as follows:
Vq1(p,mq1(p))− Vq1(p, w(p; η))
η
=
Vq1(p,mq1(p))− Vq1(p, w(p; η1(p))) + Vq1(p, w(p; η1(p)))− Vq1(p, w(p; η))
η
=
η1(p)
η
Vq1(p,mq1(p))− Vq1(p, w(p, η1(p)))
η1(p)
+
η − η1(p)
η
Vq1(p, w(p; η1(p)))− Vq1(p, w(p; η))
η − η1(p)
=
η1(p)
η
v(a∗, 1) +
η − η1(p)
η
1−p
1−p
[
Vq1(p,mq1(p))− Vq1
(
p, w
(
p; η−η1(p)1−p
1−p
))]
η − η1(p)
=
η1(p)
η
v(a∗, 1) +
η − η1(p)
η
G
(
p;
η − η1(p)
1−p
1−p
)
Since we have already shown that G(p; η) is increasing in η and weakly larger than
v(a∗, 1), we have that the gradient G(p; η) is also weakly increasing in η (and greater
than v(a∗, 1)).
We now treat the case P = ∅. Define η¯(p) as the solution to ϕη¯(p) = ϕ(p, w(p; η¯(p))) = q.
Note that for any p ∈ [q, q], for any η ≤ η¯, ϕη ∈ [q, q]. Therefore, for all η ≤ η¯, η =
(1 − δ)(1 − λη) since the ratio mq1 (1)−w(ϕη)1−ϕη is constant in η and so is ϕ(ϕη,w(ϕη)). (Recall
that we vary η at a fixed p.) It follows then from Equation (3) that
G(p; η) = (1− δ)
η
(1− λη)v(a∗, 1) + δ
η
[
Vq1(p,w(p))− Vq1
(
p,w(p) +
η − (1− δ)(1− λη)
δ
[m(1)− u(a∗, 1)]
)]
,
=
(1− δ)
η
(1− λη)v(a∗, 1) = v(a∗, 1).
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We have that the gradient G(p; η) is equal to v(a∗, 1) for all p ∈ (q, q], for all η ≤ η¯. Finally,
when η > η¯, the same decomposition as in the case P 6= ∅ completes the proof.
A.6.5. For all p ∈ I3, the gradient G(p; η) is increasing in η.
We only treat the case P 6= ∅. (The case P = ∅ is treated analogously.) Define η¯(p) as
the solution to ϕη¯(p) = ϕ(p, w(p; η¯(p))) = q∞. By construction, for all p ∈ (q∞, 1], for all
η ≤ η¯(p), we have that ϕη ∈ (q∞, 1]. Therefore, ϕη > q.
Choose η¯(p) ≤ η′ ≤ η. We have that ϕη′ ≥ ϕη ≥ q since q∞ ≥ q and, therefore,
ϕ
(
p,w(p) +
η − (1− δ)(1− λη)
δ
[mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)]
)
= ϕ(ϕη,w(ϕη)) ≥
ϕ(ϕη′ ,w(ϕη′) = ϕ
(
p,w(p) +
η′ − (1− δ)(1− λη′)
δ
[mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)]
)
.
Also, since q ≤ ϕη ≤ p, we have that ϕ(ϕη,w(ϕη)) ≥ ϕ(p,w(p)) and, therefore, η−(1−δ)(1−λη)δ ≤
0. The same applies to η′. Finally, as already shown,
η − (1− δ)(1− λη)
δ
<
η′ − (1− δ)(1− λη′)
δ
.
To ease notations, define (λ˜η, ϕ˜η) as follows:
λ˜η = λ
(
p,w(p)− (1− δ)(1− λη)− η
δ
[m(1)− u(a∗, 1)]
)
ϕ˜η = ϕ
(
p,w(p)− (1− δ)(1− λη)− η
δ
[m(1)− u(a∗, 1)]
) (4)
Notice that ϕ˜η = ϕ(ϕη,w(ϕη)) ∈ I1 since ϕη > q∞.
The rest of the proof is purely algebraic and mirrors the case p ∈ I1. First, we have the
following:
Vq1(p,w(p))− Vq1
(
p,w(p)− (1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δ
[
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
])
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δ
=
λ˜ηVq1
(
ϕ˜η,mq1(ϕ˜η) +
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δλ˜η
[
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
])− λ˜ηVq1 (ϕ˜η,mq1(ϕ˜η))
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δ
=
Vq1
(
ϕ˜η, w
(
ϕ˜η;
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δλ˜η
))
− Vq1
(
ϕ˜η,mq1(ϕ˜η)
)
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δλ˜η
,
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where we again use Observation A. Similarly, we have:
Vq1(p, w(p))− Vq1
(
p, w(p)− (1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′
δ
[
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
])
(1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′
δ
=
λ˜ηVq1
(
ϕ˜η, w
(
ϕ˜η;
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δλ˜η
))
− λ˜ηVq1
(
ϕ˜η, w
(
ϕ˜η;
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δλ˜η
− (1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′
δλ˜η
))
(1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′
δ
=
Vq1
(
ϕ˜η, w
(
ϕ˜η;
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δλ˜η
))
− Vq1
(
ϕ˜η, w
(
ϕ˜η;
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δλ˜η
− (1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′
δλ˜η
))
(1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′
δλ˜η
,
where again we use Observation A and the fact
(1− δ)(1− λη)− η
δλ˜η
>
(1− δ)(1− λη′)− η′
δλ˜η
.
Since ϕ˜η ∈ I1, we have that:
Vq1
(
ϕ˜η, w
(
ϕ˜η;
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δλ˜η
))
− Vq1
(
ϕ˜η, w
(
ϕ˜η;
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δλ˜η
− (1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′
δλ˜η
))
(1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′
δλ˜η
6
Vq1
(
ϕ˜η, w
(
ϕ˜η;
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δλ˜η
))
− Vq1
(
ϕ˜η,mq1(ϕ˜η)
)
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δλ˜η
,
where the inequality follows from our previous argument on the interval I1.
It follows that:
Vq1(p, w(p))− Vq1
(
p, w(p)− (1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η
′
δ
[
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
])
(1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′
δ
6
Vq1(p, w(p))− Vq1
(
p, w(p)− (1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δ
[
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
])
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δ
.
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From Equation (3), we then have that
1
η
[
Vq1(p,mq1(p))− Vq1(p,w(p; η))
]
=
(1− δ) (1− λη)
η
v(a∗, 1) +
[
(1− δ) (1− λη)
η
− 1
] Vq1(p, w(p))− Vq1 (p, w(p)− (1−δ)(1−λη)−ηδ [m(1)− u(a∗, 1)])
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δ
> (1− δ) (1− λη)
η
v(a∗, 1) +
[
(1− δ) (1− λη)
η
− 1
] Vq1(p, w(p))− Vq1 (p, w(p)− (1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′δ [mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)])
(1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′
δ
=
(1− δ) (1− λη)
η
v(a∗, 1) +
[
1− (1− δ) (1− λη)
η
] Vq1 (p, w(p)− (1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′δ [mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)])− Vq1(p, w(p))
(1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′
δ
=
(1− δ) (1− λη′)
η′
v(a∗, 1) +
[
1− (1− δ) (1− λη′)
η′
] Vq1 (p, w(p)− (1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′δ [mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)])− Vq1(p, w(p))
(1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′
δ
+
[
(1− δ) (1− λη′)
η′
− (1− δ) (1− λη)
η
]Vq1
(
p, w(p)− (1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η
′
δ
[
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
])− Vq1(p, w(p))
(1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′
δ
− v(a∗, 1)

> 1
η′
[
Vq1(p,mq1(p))− Vq1(p, w(p; η′))
]
,
where the last inequality follows from:
Vq1
(
p, w(p)− (1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′
δ
[
mq1(1)− u(a∗, 1)
])− Vq1(p, w(p))
(1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′
δ
=
λ˜η′Vq1(ϕ˜η′ ,mq1(ϕ˜η′))− λ˜η′Vq1
(
ϕ˜η′ , w
(
ϕ˜η′ ;
(1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′
δλ˜η′
))
(1−δ)(1−λη′ )−η′
δ
> v(a∗, 1).
We now show that the the gradient G(p; η) is smaller than v(a∗, 1) for any η ≤ η¯(p). From
Equation (3), we have that:
1
η
[
Vq1(p,mq1(p))− Vq1(p,w(p; η))
]
=
(1− δ)(1− λη)
η
v(a∗, 1)−
[
(1− δ) (1− λη)
η
− 1
] Vq1 (p, w(p)− (1−δ)(1−λη)−ηδ [m(1)− u(a∗, 1)])− Vq1(p, w(p))
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δ
= v(a∗, 1)−
[
(1− δ) (1− λη)
η
− 1
]Vq1
(
p, w(p)− (1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δ
[m(1)− u(a∗, 1)]
)
− Vq1(p, w(p))
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δ
− v(a∗, 1)

= v(a∗, 1)−
[
(1− δ) (1− λη)
η
− 1
] λ˜ηVq1(ϕ˜η,mq1(ϕ˜η))− λ˜ηVq1
(
ϕ˜η, w
(
ϕ˜η;
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δλ˜η
))
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δ
− v(a∗, 1)

= v(a∗, 1)−
[
(1− δ) (1− λη)
η
− 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
Vq1(ϕ˜η,mq1(ϕ˜η))− Vq1
(
ϕ˜η, w
(
ϕ˜η;
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δλ˜η
))
(1−δ)(1−λη)−η
δλ˜η
− v(a∗, 1)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
6 v(a∗, 1),
where the inequality follows from the fact that ϕ˜η ≤ p and, therefore from our argu-
ments on the interval I1 (where we show that the gradient is larger than v(a∗, 1)).
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Finally, we can use a similar decomposition as in the case p ∈ I2 to prove that the
gradient is increasing for all η.
A.7. Proof of Corollary 1. We first compute the principal’s payoff induced by our pol-
icy. To ease notation, we write ϕ for ϕ(p,w(p)). We first assume that q∗ = q1, compute
the value function Vq1(p,m(p)) for all p and check that it is concave. By construction, the
principal’s payoff satisfies:
Vq1(p,m(p)) = (1− δ) + δVq1(p,w(p)) = (1− δ)v(a∗, p) + δ
1− p
1− ϕ(v(a
∗, ϕ).
Remember that
w(p) =
m(p)− (1− δ)u(a0, p)
δ
=
1− p
1− ϕm(ϕ) +
p− ϕ
1− ϕm(1).
Since w(p) = m(p) = u(a0, p) when p ≤ p, we have that ϕ = p and, therefore, the principal
payoff is 1 when p ≤ p. Assume that p > p. We have that:
w(p) =
u(a1, p)− (1− δ)u(a0, p)
δ
=
1− p
1− ϕu(a0, ϕ) +
p− ϕ
1− ϕu(a1, 1),
since m(ϕ) = u(a0, ϕ) and ϕ ≤ p. (To see this, if ϕ > p, then m(ϕ) = u(a1, ϕ), hence
w(p) = m(p), a contradiction with w(p) > m(p) when p > p.) The above equation is
equivalent to:
(1− ϕ)[u(a1, p)− (1− δ)u(a0, p)] = δ[(1− p)u(a0, ϕ) + (p− ϕ)u(a1, 1)].
Observing that u(a, p) = (1− p)(u(a, 0)− u(a, 1)) + u(a, 1) for all a and, similarly, for ϕ, we
can simplify the above expression to
δ
1− p
1− ϕ = δ − p+ (1− p)
u(a0, 0)− u(a1, 0)
u(a1, 1)− u(a0, 1) .
Lastly, remember that the threshold p is solution to:
1− p = u(a1, 1)− u(a0, 1)
u(a0, 0)− u(a0, 1) + u(a1, 1)− u(a1, 0) ,
and, therefore,
Vq1(p,m(p)) = v(a
∗, p) + δ
(
1− 1− p
1− ϕ
)
v(a∗, 1)
=
1− p
1− pv(a
∗, p) +
[
1− 1− p
1− p + δ
(
1− 1− p
1− ϕ
)]
v(a∗, 1)
=
1− p
1− pv(a
∗, p).
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Since the KG’s policy induces the same payoff, it is also optimal.
A.8. First best. This section provide details on the solution to the first-best problem.
Let
α∗1 = 1−
m(p)− u(a∗, p)
p(m(1)− u(a∗, 1)) =
M(p)−m(p)− (1− p)(m(0)− u(a∗, 0))
p(m(1)− u(a∗, 1)) .
Note that α∗1 ≤ 1, with equality if m(p) = u(a∗, p)), and α∗1 < 0 if M(p) − m(p) − (1 −
p)(m(0)− u(a∗, 0)) < 0.
At an optimum, the participation constraint clearly binds. If m(0) − u(a∗, 0) = 0, the
solution is clearly (1, M(p)−m(p)
p(m(1)−u(a∗,1))). Assume that m(0) − u(a∗, 0) > 0. We can rewrite the
principal’s objective as a function of α1:
pα1v(a
∗, 1) + (1− p)v(a∗, 0) if α1 ≤ max(0, α∗1),
pα1
(
v(a∗, 1)− v(a∗, 0)m(1)−u(a∗,1)
m(0)−u(a∗,0)
)
+ M(p)−m(p)
m(0)−u(a∗,0)v(a
∗, 0) if max(0, α∗1) ≤ α1 ≤ M(p)−m(p)p(m(1)−u(a∗,1)) ,
−∞ otherwise.
Note that the objective is continuous in α1. The optimal payoff is therefore:
pmax(0, α∗1)v(a
∗, 1) + (1− p) max
(
M(p)−m(p)
(1− p)(m(0)− u(a∗, 0)) , 1
)
v(a∗, 0),
obtained with (α0, α1) =
(
M(p)−m(p)
(1−p)(m(0)−u(a∗,0)) , 0
)
if M(p)−m(p)
(1−p)(m(0)−u(a∗,0)) ≤ 1 and (α0, α1) = (1, α∗1),
otherwise.
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